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CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The Common Council of the City of Ithaca' makes the follow-
ing findings:
A. Based on a comparison of Tompkins County's average an-
nual wages and median annual rent... with similar statistics
for surrounding counties, a rental housing affordability
problem exists in the City of Ithaca.
B. Problems exist in the relationship between landlords and
tenants, as well as between landlords and their neighbors
and tenants and their neighbors.
2
INTRODUCTION
Sign here. The landlord utters these words, the tenant signs, and
it is done. The leasehold is established. It begins in "college towns,"
'3
which often are wrought with rental problems, as it does in other com-
munities. But, college communities are usually small and isolated,
which forces students to rent housing under unsatisfactory condi-
tions.4 Some of the houses and apartments in these college towns are
in poor condition, yet because they are replete with legend and lore,
they attract those students who value popularity above comfort.5 For
both the student6 and the residential populations, however, certain
particularities of college towns necessitate their living in substandard
accommodations and entering into unfair form leases.
7
The unique rental markets of college towns have made both
rental affordability and landlord-tenant disputes areas of great con-
1 Ithaca, New York, located in Tompkins County, is the home of both Cornell Uni-
versity and Ithaca College. The Common Council of the City of Ithaca is the legislative
body for Ithaca.
2 ITH~cA, N.Y., CODE § 100-1 (A)-(B) (1994) (footnote added).
3 For the purpose of this Note, the term "college town" refers to either a city or a
town in which the college or university is the primary focus. Some examples of college
towns are Davis, California (University of California Davis); Boulder, Colorado (University
of Colorado); Gainesville, Florida (University of Florida); Lawrence, Kansas (University of
Kansas); Ann Arbor, Michigan (University of Michigan); Ithaca, New York; Burlington,
Vermont (University of Vermont); Charlottesville, Virigina (University of Virginia); and
Lexington, Virginia (Washington & Lee University). This Note focuses almost exclusively
on the college town of Ithaca, New York.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 91-96.
5 See Evan Atkins, It Takes a Village, W & L: WASH. & LEE U. ALUMNI MAG., Summer
1997, at 14, 16-20 (detailing and providing a history of some of the legendary dwellings at
Washington & Lee University in Lexington, Virginia).
6 For the first few years of school, most students live in dormitories. In fact, at many
schools students must live in fraternities, sororities, or off-campus apartments after their
freshman or sophomore year. For example, about 52% of the students at Washington &
Lee live either off-campus or in fraternities. See id. at 17 (describing the distribution at
Washington & Lee, where 48% of the students live in dorms, 18% live in fraternity houses,
and 34% live off campus); see also infra text accompanying notes 83-84 (noting the substan-
tial number of students that live in apartments in Ithaca).
7 See infra Part III.A.
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cern. Indeed, the Common Council of Ithaca found that "[t]hese
problems are serious enough to warrant city action"8 in the form of
the "Rental Housing Advisory Commission."9 The landlord-tenant dif-
ficulties prevalent in college towns force tenants to live in dilapidated
residences and to pay excessive rent. More disturbingly, landlords
often present renters with biased form leases on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis.10
This Note contemplates the problems that exist between owners
and renters, addressing both market inefficiency and bargaining ine-
quality." It details the use of form leases, which typically limit the
rights and remedies of renters. In particular, it focuses on Ithaca,
New York, analyzing the local rental market and offering a way to alle-
viate that market's problems. This Note does not contend that arms-
length contracting should replace the use of form leases; rather, it
suggests both that Ithaca landlords currently employ form leases that
disfavor renters and that, instead, they should use a more amicable
one. Furthermore, this Note argues that to resolve some of the
unique difficulties that college town renters face, Ithaca residents
should demand that landlords use only a form lease that resembles
the Davis Model Lease ("DML").12
Part I briefly reviews the historical development of landlord-ten-
ant law to illustrate how the lease contract became such a significant
element of the landlord-tenant relationship. It then catalogs and ex-
amines the prevalence of typical standard form leases. Part II de-
scribes the characteristics of college towns in general and of Ithaca in
particular. This Part portrays the leasing dynamic in Ithaca and draws
an analogy between present-day Ithaca and the company town of the
early twentieth century. Part III demonstrates how typical form leases
cause problems in the Ithaca rental market. It articulates how the
8 ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 100-1(C) (1994).
9 Id. § 100-2. Currently, the Rental Housing Advisory Commission, which the Com-
mon Council of the City of Ithaca found so important in 1990, is on the verge of disband-
ing and has proposed no significant initiatives to alleviate the rental problems in Ithaca.
See Interview with Kathleen Decker, Rental Housing Specialist for the Ithaca Building De-
partment and Member of the Rental Housing Advisory Commission, in Ithaca, N.Y. (Nov.
4, 1997) (notes on file with author).
10 See infrta Part III.A.2.
11 Some of these problems also apply to cities and towns other than college towns.
Similarly, a form lease like the Davis Model Lease ("DML") certainly would help in most
rental markets. Some of the same landlord-tenant dilemmas on which this Note focuses
probably also exist in larger cities. In particular, the characteristics of a college town might
resemble the characteristics of a resort town or another small city. Despite these similari-
ties, the scope of this Note concentrates on the rental environment in college towns, focus-
ing specifically on Ithaca, New York. The rental market in Ithaca is sufficiently
representative of other college towns, and this Note focuses solely on college towns be-
cause their rental markets are particularly susceptible to landlord abuses. See infra Part II.
12 DAvis MODEL LEASE (University of California Davis, 1992). For a complete copy of
the DML, see Appendix.
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rental market provides an example of a market failure, and it explains
why tenants are unlikely to negotiate for favorable terms when signing
a form lease. This Part continues by describing how Ithaca's college
students affect the rental market because they act with both rational
ignorance and undue optimism. Finally, Part IV offers a solution to
this problem by advocating the cooperative adoption of the DML.
This Note then concludes by discussing how the DML's use will equal-
ize the relative bargaining positions of owners and renters in Ithaca.
I
THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP AND FoRM LEASES
A. The Historical Development of the Modem Landlord-Tenant
Relationship
Though it initially developed in property law, the landlord-tenant
relationship gradually has grown roots in contract law.'3 Because con-
tract law extensively affects the modem landlord-tenant relationship,
any serious attempt to alleviate inequalities inherent in that relation-
ship must focus on the nature of the contract itself, as embodied in
the lease. Nevertheless, to understand fully the modem relationship
between landlords and tenants, one first must comprehend its origins
and how it has changed.
The English estate system began in 1066 when William of Nor-
mandy defeated Harold Godwinson to claim the English throne.14
The social structure of England developed around the land tenure in
which a man's relationship to his land and to his lord defined his
social position. 15 Under this system, the lord owned the land and
granted possession to tenants in exchange for labor. 16 These tenants
in turn granted land to other tenants, creating a feudal pyramid of
personal obligations in exchange for land.'7 Despite the very per-
13 See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Correctly Interpreting Long-Term Leases Pursuant to Modem
Contract Law: Toward a Theory of Relational Leases, 74 VA. L. REv. 751, 751-53 (1988) (examin-
ing the courts' shift from using property law to relying on contract law to interpret aliena-
bility clauses). But see Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord-Tenant
Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 504 (1982) (arguing that "landlord-tenant case law was already
deeply pervaded by contract notions by the end of the nineteenth century" and maintain-
ing that "[I] ease law was never pure property law"). Professor Glendon primarily contends
"that the movement in residential lease law has been not from one area of private law to
another, but from private ordering to public regulation." Id. at 505.
14 See A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE LAND LAw 2 (2d ed. 1986) (contending "that
the feudal structure of society... was firmly established in England after the Norman
Conquest").
15 See id. at 2-4.
16 See id.
17 See id. at 5-6. Usually the obligations included providing knights for the lord, often
through "subinfeudation." Id. at 5. In subinfeudation, a tenant-in-chief would grant a par-
cel of land to a subtenant and would assign the subtenant to be the knight provided for the
landlord. See id. Interestingly, the terms "landlord" and "tenant" continue to dominate
546 [Vol. 84:543
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sonal nature of the lord-tenant relationship, land became both inher-
itable and freely alienable by the thirteenth century.18
Feudalism as well as English law developed two categories of es-
tates: the freehold estates-consisting of the "fee simple," the "fee
tail," and the "life estate"-and the nonfreehold, or leasehold, es-
tate-consisting of the "term of years."' 9 The freehold estates pro-
vided a family with economic stability within a community, while the
property system treated the term of years differently.20 The leasehold
estate did not have social significance in the feudal system; rather, this
estate established a relationship between the landlord and the tenant
and based that relationship solely on a personal contract.2' The ten-
ant did not retain rights in the property until the law allowed him to
enforce the contract, which thereby secured his promised interest in
the property.22 Nevertheless, the tenant's interest in the property re-
lied as much on contract law as it did on property law.
23
the rhetoric of renting. Unfortunately, these feudal terms also reflect the reality of the
power discrepancy between the modern landlord and tenant. See EMILY JANE GOODMAN,
THE TENANT SURVIVAL BOOK 1 (1972) ("Regardless of wealth,job, education or type of car,
all tenants, because they do not own property, are second-class citizens. Within the land-
lord-tenant relationship, tenants-the people who live in the buildings-are powerless
compared to the person, corporation, institution or government that owns the building.").
18 See SIMPSON, supra note 14, at 51-54 (describing the development of the free aliena-
tion system and discussing the impact it might have had on a lord who may have been
"saddled with a bad tenant who is unfit to perform the service due").
19 See, e.g., CORNEUUSJ. MOYnHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 56
(2d ed. 1988); Lewis M. Simes, Historical Background of the Law of Property, in 1 AMERicAN
LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 1.7-.11 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
20 See MoYNIHAN, supra note 19, at 56-57. The term of years originated in the thir-
teenth century "as a money lending device designed to evade the Church's prohibition of
usury." Id. at 56. If an owner needed cash, he would lend a portion of his land to "recoup
both principal and profit." Id. Cornelius Moynihan attributes the distinction between
freehold and nonfreehold estates to this difference in use. See id. at 56-57. The law also
differentiated the leasehold by treating it as an interest in personal property instead of real
property, referring to it as a "chattel real." SIMPSON, supra note 14, at 248-50.
21 See ALBERT M. KALES, ESTATES, FUTURE INTERESTS AND ILLEGAL CONDITIONS AND RE-
STRAINTS IN ILLINOIS § 21, at 21 (1920).
22 S, id.
23 See SI'SON, supra note 14, at 250 (describing the uniqueness of the leasehold es-
tate because of its reliance on both contract and property law and the corresponding
problems it posed to "the old lawyers"). Though this dual contract and property system for
leaseholds still exists, the contractual element has achieved greater prominence, especially
in residential tenancies. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 19, at 58 & n.4. Some courts have taken
to the extreme the notion that contract overwhelms property. In Massachusetts, the
SupremeJudicial Court took a strong step by declaring that in its precedent on the implied
warranty of habitability, it had "overthrown the doctrine of caveat emptor and the notion
that a lease is a conveyance of property." Young v. Garwacki, 402 N.E.2d 1045, 1049 (Mass.
1980). But see 219 Broadway Corp. v. Alexander's, Inc., 387 N.E.2d 1205, 1207 (N.Y. 1979)
(recognizing that a lease's primary purpose is to act as a means of conveying real property
and that "[ u ] ntil this end is achieved, any rights or obligations of the parties which may be
embodied in the lease remain dormant"); cf Hiram H. Lesar, Landlord and Tenant, in 1
AMERiCAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 19, § 3.11, at 203 ("[I] t is idle to speculate whether
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Although the common law allowed parties to contract for various
rights and duties, it still depended heavily on property law to assess
the traditional rights and duties of landlords and tenants. 24 In gen-
eral, the common law bound the landlord to provide the tenant with a
legal right to possession 25 and to allow him quiet enjoyment of the
premises. 26 The common law, however, did not require the landlord
to warrant that the premises would be fit for the contracted use27 un-
less the parties expressly agreed to this warranty.28 Moreover, the
common law of leaseholds ignored the contract law principles requir-
ing mutual dependency of promises; thus, even if a landlord breached
his duty, the tenant would retain his obligation to pay rent.29 The
essential aspects of the rental arrangement-the payment of rent and
possession of the property-are products of property law. Therefore
the landlord grants temporary possession to the tenant and retains a
reversionary interest. In so doing, the landlord ensures that posses-
the land or the promise is the principal element of a lease .... If the warp is conveyance,
the woof is contract and neither alone makes a whole cloth.").
24 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 19, at 71-72.
25 See id. at 72. This requirement represents a contentious area of the law. The courts
have taken two views concerning the requirements of providing a tenant with the right to
possession. Some courts have espoused the English Rule, which gives the tenant a right to
delivery of possession by the landlord. Under this rule, if there is a holdover tenant or
some other reason that prevents the tenant from taking possession, then the tenant has a
cause of action against the landlord for breach of this duty. See Lesar, supra note 23, § 3.37,
at 250-51. Other courts have recognized the American Rule, which requires that the land-
lord provide the tenant with a legal right to possession, but does not require the landlord
actually to deliver the premises. See id. at 250. This view immunizes the landlord from
liability for the holdover tenant's tort, but still gives the tenant a cause of action against the
holdover tenant himself. See id. at 251.
26 See MoYNiHAN, supra note 19, at 72; Lesar, supra note 23, § 3.38 (stating that the
caselaw provides the landlord with a limited license to enter the premises once the lease
commences, for example to collect rent or to make repairs, and that some authority fur-
ther requires that the tenant consent in the latter circumstance).
27 See MOyNIHAN, supra note 19, at 72; see also CHARLES W. SLOANE, LANDLORDS AND
TENANTS 13-14 (1878) (addressing New York's rejection of the warranty of habitability
upon turnover). The traditional view of a tenancy held that the tenant took the property
at his own risk. This doctrine of caveat emptor was the rule for leaseholds. See id.; Lesar,
supra note 23, § 3.45, at 267. Early court decisions uniformly held that caveat emptor gov-
erned the leasehold, refusing to recognize an implied covenant that the premises would be
fit for habitation. See, e.g., id. at 267 n.2. The term "caveat emptor" literally means "[l]et a
buyer beware." BLAcK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 222 (6th ed. 1990). The term "summarizes the
rule that a purchaser must examine, judge, and test for himself." Id.
28 See Lesar, supra note 23, § 3.45, at 267 (noting that the tenant alone retains the
option either to "inspect the premises and determine for himself their suitability" before
entering into a lease or to contract for "an express warranty" to ensure protection).
29 See MovuIHAN, supra note 19, at 73-74; see also Lesar, supra note 23, § 3.45, at 267
(noting that a tenant could not use the unfitness of the premises "either as a defense to an
action for rent or as a basis for recovery in tort for damages to person or property" (foot-
note omitted)). Courts did recognize some exceptions to caveat emptor, such as the "fur-
nished house" exception, which provided a defense to an action for rent to a tenant who
did not have an opportunity to inspect the complete premises prior to leasing. See id. at
267-68.
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sion of the property returns to him after the lease term expires.30 The
law of contract began to "infiltrate" landlord-tenant law3l when courts
recognized that a landlord should not retain the right to collect rent
after he wrongfully had evicted the tenant.
3 2
Until the latter part of the twentieth century, courts and legisla-
tures stood firmly on the ground of caveat emptor,33 but they eventu-
ally realized that property law, which had developed around agrarian
leases, dealt insufficiently with the problems facing urban tenants.3 4
The states slowly began to abandon caveat emptor and turned to con-
tract law, requiring landlords to deliver the premises in a habitable
condition and to maintain this condition throughout the leasehold.35
The D.C. Circuit brought this implied warranty of habitability into the
mainstream in the leading case of Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,
36
an influential decision that convinced other courts to hold that an
30 This transaction itself is a lease, obligating both the renter to pay rent and the
landlord to deliver possession. See Lesar, supra note 23, § 3.2. Before the modem reliance
on contract law, a lease did not need to enumerate the rights and duties of each party
because the courts treated a lease as a conveyance and relied solely on property law to
determine whether covenants were mutually dependent, whether the tenant was liable for
rent if some event destroyed the property, or whether a landlord had to mitigate damages
if the tenant were to abandon the premises. See id. § 3.11, at 202-03. Today, courts rely on
contract law to resolve these questions. See id. at 203-04.
31 3A ARTHuR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRAars § 686, at 242 (1960).
32 See Mo Nm, supra note 19, at 74. Wrongful eviction is not limited to the forcible
removal of a tenant from the property. If the landlord evicts a tenant from a "substantial
part" of the premises, this wrongful eviction relieves the tenant of his duty to pay rent
because the eviction interferes with the essence of his use. 3A CORBIN, supra note 31,
§ 686, at 241. A landlord's failure to provide certain necessities, such as heat and light,
constitutes a "constructive eviction," which allows the tenant to both abandon the leased
premises and refuse to pay rent. Id. at 242-43 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the
case of a constructive eviction, the courts abandon property law and apply the contract
principle of mutual dependency, see id., which they rarely did at common law, see supra note
29 and accompanying text. As in most states, New York courts have recognized this doc-
trine and have applied it in numerous situations. See, e.g., Tallman v. Murphy, 24 N.E. 716,
718 (N.Y. 1890) (releasing the tenant from his obligation to pay rent after he abandoned
the premises because of "repeated explosions, which caused the walls and ceilings to crack
... and the rooms... [to] fill[ ] with smoke and coal gas [that made] the inmates sick");
Flechner v. Douglass, 239 N.Y.S. 121, 122 (App. Div. 1929) (holding that a tenant who
abandoned his property potentially could forego his rental obligation because the landlord
did not supply hot water).
33 See GOODMAN, supra note 17, at 26-27 (describing the historical prevalence of caveat
emptor and its recent demise).
34 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 19, at 76 ("The old rules that had their source in a rural
agricultural society were found to be unsuited to an urban society faced with a critical
housing shortage.").
35 See id. at 77 (noting that "[tihe courts have substituted an implied in law warranty
of habitability that results in a duty on the part of the landlord to put and maintain the
dwelling unit in a condition that meets the standards set out in the relevant state and
municipal housing codes").
36 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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implied warranty exists in lease agreements.3 7 The Javins court rea-
soned that urban tenants were ill-suited to repair their apartments be-
cause they lacked the specialized skills to perform maintenance
work.3 8 The court approached landlord-tenant law from the perspec-
tive of consumer protection. It reasoned that tenants were basically
consumers buying a product, and if a tenant was to pay the same
amount of rent during the lease period, the apartment should remain
in substantially the same condition throughout.39 Javins's progeny has
retreated from caveat emptor, requiring a minimum standard of hab-
itability for the urban apartment.40 The development of the contract
law notion of mutually dependent lease clauses propelled the lease to
the forefront of and opened the gateway to the modem landlord-ten-
ant relationship.
B. The Prevalence and Inequality of the Typical Form Lease
Post-Javins developments in landlord-tenant law have benefited
those tenants who are willing and able to confront their landlord in
court to enforce their expanded rights. In theory, a landlord cannot
include a provision in a lease that courts or statutes have deemed un-
enforceable. Nevertheless, landlords continue to include in most
leases provisions that conflict with the law4l because courts invalidate
these provisions only on a case-by-case basis. 42 This case-by-case ap-
proach means that when a court strikes down an unenforceable provi-
sion in one residential lease, "similar provisions in other leases remain
untouched. '43 For example, the Supreme Court has held that form
37 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 19, at 77 ("Although Javins was not the first case to an-
nounce the rule of an implied warranty of habitability in residential tenancies, it was influ-
ential in persuading other courts to adopt the concept." (foomote omitted)).
38 SeeJavins, 428 F.2d at 1078; see also 1 MILTON R. FRmEDMAN, FIIEDMAN ON LE.ASas
§ 1.1, at 7 (4th ed. 1997) ("The parties may differ in their expectations of who will make
repairs within the leased quarters, but neither expects [the] tenant to maintain the roof,
foundation, and walls, the heating, electrical or plumbing systems, or the means of
access.").
39 SeeJavins, 428 F.2d at 1079.
40 See MOYNIHAN, supra note 19, at 78 (noting that either by statute or by judicial
decision, most states have abandoned caveat emptor and have required the landlord to
keep the premises habitable). For an example of a case that examines the factual require-
ments to maintain a valid cause of action under the warranty of habitability, see Solow v.
Wellner, 595 N.Y.S.2d 619 (App. Term 1992).
41 See Bailey Kuklin, On the Knowing Inclusion of Unenforceable Contract and Lease Term,
56 U. CIN. L. Ray. 845, 845 & n.1 (1988). For example, most form leases contain provi-
sions waiving the tenant's right to a jury trial, requiring the tenant to pay the landlord's
legal expenses in the event of litigation, or waiving other statutory rights. SeeAllen R. Bent-
ley, An Alternative Residential Lease, 74 COLUM. L. R-v. 836, 841-51 (1974) ("[T]he tradi-
tional form lease takes away many of the tenant's protections under preexisting law ... by
means of... waivers of statutory rights."); Kurt E. Olafsen, Note, Preventing the Use of Unen-
forceable Provisions in Residential Leases, 64 CORNELL L. R-v. 522, 523-24 (1979).
42 See Bentley, supra note 41, at 837 & n.11.
43 Olafsen, supra note 41, at 522.
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waivers of constitutional rights, such as the right to a jury trial, are
unenforceable contracts of adhesion,44 which involve a "great dispar-
ity in bargaining power."45 Despite this holding, many form leases
continue to state explicitly that tenants waive their right both to ajury
trial in any legal proceeding against the landlord and to counterclaim
in any proceeding in which the landlord attempts to regain
possession.
46
Form leases create a more pervasive problem because courts
rarely invalidate an entire form lease.47 As a result, other landlords
continue to use them despite their illegal provisions. The form lease
in McKinney's Formzs 8 provides a poignant example of this problem.
Section twenty-four of this form lease allows a landlord to terminate
the lease if a court declares that a tenant is bankrupt.49 The pocket
supplement, which probably only a lawyer or law student would know
to reference, specifically declares that section twenty-four is now void
pursuant to federal statute.50 Because landlords probably will not re-
fer to the pocket part, however, they likely will continue to use the
44 Contracts of adhesion essentially are form contracts that one party has written and
that leave little or no room for negotiation. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An
Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HAnv. L. REv. 1173, 1177 (1983) (outlining "seven characteris-
tics" that demarcate adhesion contracts); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529, 549-53 (1971) (discussing the
coercive nature of contracts of adhesion). For a discussion of the characteristics of con-
tracts of adhesion, see infra note 165.
45 D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972). In Overmyer, the Court
held that when a corporation waives one of its rights through a contract, the contractual
term is enforceable if the corporation was aware of the legal consequences. See id. at 187.
The Court also noted, however, that if the facts differed such that "the contract [was] one
of adhesion, where there [was] great disparity in bargaining power," and if the party re-
ceived no consideration for the waiver, then the legal issue is different, and Overmyeris not
controlling precedent. Id. at 188.
46 See 11A McdamqEY s FoRMs, REAL PROPERm PRACTCE § 6:20, at 58-59 (1980); see also
CuRTIs J. BERGER, LAND OwNERsHIP AND USE § 5.1, at 236-43 (3d ed. 1983) (providing a
copy of the "Standard Form of Apartment Lease Approved by the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York").
47 See Bentley, supra note 41, at 837 ("Although courts may invalidate certain terms
contained in contracts of adhesion, they are unlikely to hold all the clauses in a printed-
form lease unenforceable.").
48 11A McKiNNEvs FoRMs, REAL PROPERTY PRACTICE (1980).
49 See 11A id. § 6:20, at 57 ("If the TENANT is declared bankrupt or insolvent in any
action or proceeding or if the TENANT makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors,
then the LANDLORD may, if he wishes, terminate this lease by giving the TENANT 30 days
notice of such termination.").
50 See 11A id. § 6:20 (Supp. 1998) ("Paragraph 24 of the lease set forth in the main
volume is no longer valid and should be disregarded. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(c) (1).").
Contrary to the citation in the pocket supplement, the section that appears to invalidate
paragraph 24 is 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1) (B), which legislates that "an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or modified... at any time after the
commencement of the [bankruptcy] case solely because of a provision in such contract or
lease that is conditioned on... the commencement of a case under this title." 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(e) (1) (B) (1994).
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entire form, including the unenforceable provision. Moreover, ten-
ants will not know that it is invalid.
What benefit does a landlord derive from inserting an unenforce-
able provision? The answer is twofold. First, the practical effect of an
unenforceable provision typically benefits the landlord.5 1 In the event
of a dispute with the landlord, a tenant probably will read the lease to
ascertain his rights under the agreement. The tenant likely will be-
lieve that every provision is binding52 because he is ignorant about the
law and presumes that his landlord, on the other hand, knows the
applicable law and would not include an invalid lease term.53 The
tenant, therefore, will "be deceived into foregoing valid claims or de-
fenses against his landlord. '54 Compounding this problem is the fact
that the tenant is unlikely to consult a lawyer in the event of a dis-
pute.55 Moreover, even if the renter does discover that the lease term
is unenforceable, he "is not likely to suffer [or prove] significant ac-
tual damages."56 In this event, the tenant will not recover substantial
damages,5 7 and the court simply will declare the term invalid and ana-
lyze the dispute without it. Because the court will not impose any pun-
ishment on the landlord,58 the landlord possesses no legal incentive
to remove the unenforceable lease provision.59
51 See Olafsen, supra note 41, at 522.
52 See id.; see also Kuklin, supra note 41, at 846 n.3 (suggesting that the author "and
others believe that tenants do have faith in the enforceability of terms"); Warren Mueller,
Residential Tenants and Their Leases: An Empirical Study, 69 MICH. L. R~v. 247, 272 (1970)
(reporting that in his study, over half of the surveyed tenants believed that two particular
lease provisions were enforceable, though in reality the provision "would be struck down,
either as violative of a specific statutory prohibition or as contrary to public policy").
53 See Kuklin, supra note 41, at 862 ("[I] t is the [tenant]'s knowledge that he is igno-
rant and his belief that the [landlord] is not that inclines the [tenant] to rely upon the
implicit assertion of the enforceablility of the term.").
54 Olafsen, supra note 41, at 522. Professor Bailey Kuklin explains how the retention
of unenforceable provisions works to the advantage of the landlord:
An offeror may be tempted to include such terms on the rationale that little
may be lost and much might be gained. For if the offeree never learns of
his rights and a dispute arises, the offeror might gain an advantage not
otherwise obtainable, such as an immediate capitulation by the offeree or a
beneficial settlement. If the offeree does learn, well, what can he do about
it other than exercise the rights he had anyway.
Kuklin, supra note 41, at 845-46.
55 See Mueller, supra note 52, app. c at 298 (question 51) (noting that 84% of the
surveyed tenants claimed that they had not consulted a lawyer concerning a dispute that
arose after signing the lease).
56 Kuklin, supra note 41, at 846 (explaining that because the tenant discovers the term
before enforcement, the tenant has not been harmed by its inclusion and therefore has no
claim for damages on this basis).
57 See id. at 885-92 (articulating the overwhelming problems the tenant will encounter
in recovering significant damages under either tort or contract theory).
58 See id. at 846 ("Unless there is a specific statutory prohibition of the practice which
provides an admonitory sanction, there is little to deter the [landlord].").
59 See id. (indicating that if the landlord includes the illegal term and a court deems it
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Landlords derive a second benefit from including the unenforce-
able provision. If the tenant ignores the lease term and legally chal-
lenges the landlord, the presumption of validity in the crowded court
system aids the landlord. 60 The city courts that typically handle land-
lord-tenant disputes often are "rushed, crowded, and informal fo-
rums, where most litigants are unrepresented." 61 Thus, in the interest
of efficiency, judges often presume that the signed lease is "prima fa-
cie valid" and strictly enforce it as such.62 When a waiver of funda-
mental rights, such as the right to a jury trial, is involved, courts are
supposed to "indulge every reasonable presumption" against the
term.63 If the waiver does not impede a fundamental right, however,
courts presume that the contract is valid.64 Even when a court invali-
dates a term in one tenant's form lease, landlords will continue to use
unenforceable, the landlord is no worse than if he simply had left out the term, but if the
term discourages legal action, the landlord actually has benefited from its inclusion).
60 See Bentley, supra note 41, at 837-39.
61 Id. at 838.
62 Id. at 838-39. But cf Avildsen v. Prystay, 574 N.Y.S.2d 535, 535 (App. Div. 1991)
(stating that a judge may nullify a contract when "an egregiously oppressive contractual
provision was perceived to emanate from a gross inequality in bargaining power between
the contracting parties"). While courts are supposed to construe the language of a con-
tract against the drafter, they should do so only when the contract term is ambiguous. See
Jacobson v. Sassower, 489 N.E.2d 1283, 1284 (N.Y. 1985) ("Because the retainer clause of
this agreement is ambiguous, [the trial court] properly construed it against [the] defen-
dant. .. ."); 196 Owners Corp. v. Hampton Management Co., 642 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317 (App.
Div. 1996) (stating that "any ambiguity in the agreement should be construed against the
drafter"). Some commentators have criticized the strict enforcement of lease terms in
form leases because tenants often do not read or understand these terms. See, e.g., Mueller,
supra note 52, at 257 ("Fulminate as one will about the just deserts of carelessness, the lax
reading habits of the public can lead to unexpected obligations on a scale large enough to
require a re-examination of basic tenets concerning the efficacy of signing a form or the
enforceability of onerous fine print.").
63 Street v. Davis, 542 N.Y.S.2d 968, 969 (Civ. Ct. 1989) (citing Aetna Ins. Co. v. Ken-
nedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937)) (finding a jury waiver clause unenforceable because it
appeared in fine print and was therefore inadmissible under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4544). This rule
of construction does not preclude a landlord from including an enforceable jury waiver
clause. See id. at 970 (indicating that "[tihe landlord has always had the opportunity to
include an enforceable jury waiver clause" as long as he conforms to the fine print guide-
line of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4544).
64 See, e.g., Chimart Assocs. v. Paul, 489 N.E.2d 231, 234 (N.Y. 1986) (remarking that
"there is a 'heavy presumption that a deliberately prepared and executed written instru-
ment manifest[s] the true intention of the parties'" (alteration in original) (quoting
George Backer Management Corp. v. Acme Quilting Co., 385 N.E.2d 1062 (N.Y. 1978)));
Da Silva v. Musso, 428 N.E.2d 382, 386 (N.Y. 1981) ("Under long accepted principles one
who signs a document is, absent fraud or other wrongful act of the other contracting party,
bound by its contents." (citations omitted)); Agristor Leasing v. Barlow, 579 N.Y.S.2d 476,
479 (App. Div. 1992) ("Furthermore, one who signs a written agreement is conclusively
bound by its terms unless fraud, duress or some other unlawful act on the part of a party
... has been demonstrated." (citation omitted)); State Bank v. Patel, 561 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741
(App. Div. 1990) (holding that a person who signs a contract is "'bound by its terms unless
there is a showing of fraud, duress or some other wrongful act'" (quoting Columbus Trust
Co. v. Campolo, 487 N.Y.S.2d 105, 107 (App. Div. 1985))).
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the entire form because the strategic advantages remain intact.65
Some form lease provisions and landlord actions are not simply
unenforceable; they actually violate municipal codes. 66 Landlords in-
clude these provisions in their leases because only the municipality
possesses the authority to enforce the code.67 The violation often will
continue because limited resources sometimes prevent the municipal-
ity from acting.68 Moreover, tenants, especially nonstudents, often
fear that their landlord will retaliate if they complain about poor con-
ditions,69 resulting in the perpetuation of low-quality accommoda-
tions. These illegal lease provisions therefore endure, and the
corresponding landlord actions continue, because they benefit the
landlord and largely are impossible for the tenant to prevent.
In addition to the inclusion of unenforceable and illegal provi-
sions, form leases take advantage of the tenant through the use of
disorganized formats and fine print. The chaotic arrangement of
leases makes it difficult for many tenants to locate and identify specific
provisions. Most form leases randomly organize the clauses to confuse
tenants. 70 Furthermore, form leases often are oppressively long. One
65 See Bentley, supra note 41, at 837-39 (bemoaning landlords' continued use of form
leases with provisions that courts have disallowed and describing the advantages landlords
gain from their use); Olafsen, supra note 41, at 522 (same).
66 Cf. GOODMAN, supra note 17, at 43 (implying that landlords include lease provisions
that do not comport with municipal codes).
67 See id. For example, the City of Ithaca requires that
when a tenant does not have access to individual heating control devices or
his/her device controls the temperature of other dwelling units, adequate
heat shall be provided to maintain the indoor temperature in habitable
spaces.., at 68°F. when the outside temperature falls below 55°F. between
the first day of September and the 31st day of May.
ITHACA, N.Y., CODE § 210-25(A) (2) (1996). Hypothetically, a landlord might demand that
the tenant who does have control of the heat keep it set below 68°F, in violation of the
above provision. Only the City of Ithaca has the authority to enforce the provision. A
renter can sue the owner to force the owner to turn up the heat, but the renter has no
standing to sanction the owner for wrongdoing on the basis of violating the code provision.
68 See GOODMAN, supra note 17, at 43 ("The catch [with municipal codes] is that there
is little or no code enforcement and tenants may not be able to compel any... Tenants
are in the position of slaves or children or incompetents, unable to exercise any rights on
their own.").
69 See id. at 22-23. This irrational fear exists despite the fact that most jurisdictions
outlaw retaliatory action (e.g., eviction) by landlords. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP-
ERTY, §§ 14.8-.9 (1977). Even so, many tenants are unaware of such laws and fear eviction
for challenging their landlords. Cf GOODMAN, supra note 17, at 22-23 (noting that "every-
body is afraid of the landlord").
70 See Bentley, supra note 41, at 841. Even the most basic terms of the lease, which
identify the parties and describe the premises, seek to confuse the tenant by typically em-
bodying "a welter of qualifications that, in effect, footnote the agreed-upon terms." Id. at
842. For example, a NewYork statute requires the landlord to put the tenant in possession
of the premises at the beginning of the lease, "[in the absence of an express provision to
the contrary." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 223-a (McKinney 1989). But the form lease has "an
agreement to the contrary," thereby stripping the tenant of his rights under the law. Bent-
ley, supra note 41, at 844.
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residential form lease from New York City is approximately 9100
words in length.71 In comparison, the United States Constitution con-
tains just over 7600 words. Form leases also contain fine print to dis-
courage and confuse the tenant that attempts to understand the
contract. 72 In essence, landlords hide important terms by making it
unlikely that any tenant will take the time to read the fine print.73
The Supreme Court has discouraged the use of fine print to embody
terms that waive constitutional rights,74 such as the right to a jury
trial.75 Moreover, New York courts will not admit into evidence any
lease provision that appears in fine print.76 Nevertheless, form leases
continue to use fine print to give the landlord an unfair advantage.
These stylistic devices, along with unenforceable and illegal clauses,
tether the tenant to the often unfair provisions of the form lease.
Given the prevalent use of form leases, tenants often sign leases
without bargaining for terms. The tremendous transaction costs of
investigating and understanding form leases increase the likelihood
that rational actors will choose to remain ignorant of the lease terms.
Because most renters do not scrutinize these form leases, landlords
likely will not alter the lease terms that disfavor tenants.
71 See CurtisJ. Berger, Hard Leases Make Bad Law, 74 CoLuM. L. REV. 791, 822 (1974).
Curtis Berger commented that this lease contains "more words than the Book of Hosea,
which also warned of a Lord's wrath." Id. He surveyed commonly used form leases from
various metropolitan areas. See id. at 821 & n.122. He posited that "the median-length
form, with 3800 words, could not be read and fully understood by a bright law student in
less than an hour." Id. at 822.
72 See, e.g., Bentley, supra note 41, at 839 n.13 (describing a civil court case in which
the tenant's lawyer argued that the court should disregard a waiver because the lease was
"very hard to read, and [the waiver] has twenty-five lines and is not readily apparent" (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). One commentator suggested that the print is usually so
fine that a law student might not be able to read the form. See Berger, supra note 71, at
822. To illustrate how fine the print can be, note that the text of some leases is about eight
and one-half lines per inch, which is the font of the average law review footnote. See id.
73 See Mueller, supra note 52, at 256-57 (noting that of the surveyed tenants who did
not read their leases "particularly carefully" prior to signing, 33% said that it was because
the lease was offered on a "take it or leave it" basis, 26% found the "very length of the lease
contract form to be discouraging and confusing," 20% feared that they would be unable to
understand the "legal language," and a scant three percent said that they did not want to
take the time to read the lease).
74 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972) (articulating that "a waiver of constitu-
tional rights in any context must, at the very least be clear").
75 See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
76 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4544 (McKinney 1992) (excluding "any printed contract or agree-
ment.., where the print is... less than eight points in depth or five and one-half points in





THE UNIQUE DYNAMIC OF THE LANDLORD-TENANT
RELATIONSHIP IN ITHACA
The first Part of this Note presented the current state of landlord-
tenant law and outlined the general difficulties in the relationship be-
tween renters and their landlords. The remainder of this Note ad-
dresses those aspects of this relationship that are peculiar to college
towns, especially Ithaca. This Part first catalogs the unique
demographics of college towns. Second, it draws an analogy between
the company towns of the early twentieth century and the college
towns of today. Finally, it places the college town demographic into
the economic market model that the preceding Part articulated.
A. The Characteristics of Ithaca
College towns are communities with distinct characteristics. Each
contains a university or college, which is the center of city life, and
Ithaca is no exception. 77 Indeed, most college towns could not survive
without the job market the university's presence provides. 78 Further-
more, because the university is the center of town life, students and
employees generally live nearby, providing the landlords with a fruit-
ful rental market.
Though an affordable housing problem has existed in most
American cities for the last two decades, 79 the college town is unique
because of the "captive student population."80 In Ithaca the college
population exceeds the permanent, year-round population.8' This
phenomenon is peculiar to college towns. For example, the City of
Ithaca has a college population of 56.3%, while Tompkins County,
which includes Ithaca, has a college population of only 29.4%, and
77 See supra note 3.
78 For example, according to Cornell Employment Services, Cornell University em-
ployed 2602 faculty and 8824 staff as of fall 1997, totaling 11,426. See Telephone Interview
with Cornell University Employment Services Department, Ithaca, N.Y. (Jan. 19, 1998).
According to the 1990 Census, Ithaca's population is 57,617. See Zip Rezide: 14850 (Ithaca),
Claritas, Aug. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, Geodem Library, Ziprez File. If all of these
employees live in Ithaca, 20% of the local population works for Cornell University. Even if
less than 100% of Cornell's employees live in Ithaca, the number of Ithaca residents that
Cornell University employs is staggering. Furthermore, Ithaca College employs a large
number of local residents, thereby increasing the percentage of local residents employed
by the city's higher education institutions even further.
79 See John Emmeus Davis, Introduction: Toward a Third Sector Housing Policy, in THE
AFFoDABLE Crry 1, 3 (John Emmeus Davis ed., 1994) ("The average costs of market-rate
rentals and market-priced sales have increased far faster in most American cities than aver-
age incomes over the last two decades.").
80 REGULATORY IssuES SuB-COMM., RENTAL Hous. ADVISORY COMM'N, REGULATORY Is-
SUES AND AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN ITHACA 1 (1994).




the entire State of New York has a college population of only 8.3%.82
Correspondingly, students represent a large segment of the
rental population in Ithaca. Almost fifty percent of Cornell under-
graduate students and eighty-two percent of its graduate and profes-
sional students live in off-campus housing.8 3 Similarly, thirty-three
percent of Ithaca College students are housed off campus.84 Overall
in Ithaca, the rental property vacancy rate is 4.5%, while 71.1% of the
population are renters.8 5 Comparatively, Tompkins County has a va-
cancy rate of 5.7%, and renters constitute only 44.7% of the popula-
tion.8 6 Unsurprisingly, these statistics are similar to those in other
college towns.8 7 Ithaca's Rental Housing Advisory Commission sur-
veyed six "cities comparable to Ithaca in terms of surrounding area,
population demographics, and presence of a university, 88 and the
five college towns that responded all exhibited statistics similar to
those in Ithaca.89 Perhaps most tellingly, renters occupied at least fifty
percent of the housing units in the other surveyed college towns.90
The dominance of the student population in college towns, along
with the relative isolation of cities like Ithaca from other cities that
could provide student housing, has deleterious effects on renters.91
82 See id. While it is likely that not all members of the "college population" go to
school in Ithaca, with Cornell University and Ithaca College in the city, it seems probable
that most do.
83 See CITY OF ITHACrA, COMPREHENSIVE HOUSING AFFoRDABILrrY STRATEGY 9 (1995).
84 See id.
85 See 1990 CENSUS, supra note 81, at 2; cf. CITY OF ITHACA, supra note 83, at 3 (report-
ing that the vacancy rate in Ithaca in June 1994 was 0.12%, which was down from 1.38%
the previous September). More remarkable is the fact that in an area very near to Cornell's
campus-Ithaca's "Collegetown'-a staggering 94.7% of the population is in college, the
vacancy rate is 4.3%, and 97.5% of the housing is renter occupied. See 1990 CENSUS, supra
note 81, at 1.
86 See 1990 CENSUS, supra note 81, at 2.
87 See REGULATORY ISSUES SUB-COMM., supra note 80, at 6-9.
88 Id. at 6.
89 See id. at 6-9.
90 See id. at 7 (reporting that 51% of the housing units in Lawrence, Kansas are renter
occupied; 50% in Boulder, Colorado; 65% in Burlington, Vermont; 51% in Gainesville,
Florida; and 60% in Huron (the name given to the fifth city that returned the survey
anonymously)).
91 One should not overlook the negative effects of renting to students. Most of the
problems that affect Ithaca's rental market have an impact on the landlords as well as the
students. For example, it is natural for students not to care as much about their apart-
ments as permanent residents do because students plan on staying only for a short amount
of time. See injra note 99 and accompanying text. Students often damage neighborhoods
and property. See Kevin Harlin, Turf War: Noisy Students with Unkempt Houses Exasperate
Neighbors, ITmAcAJ., Sept. 14, 1996, at IA ("The conflict is a common one in college towns
across the country, and permanent residents of certain neighborhoods on South and East
hills for years have been plagued by intoxicated Cornell University and Ithaca College...
students walking back to campuses late at night."); see also Andreae Downs, Dialogue on
Neighborhood Held, BOSTON GLOBE, May 10, 1998, § 12 (City Weekly), at 7 (noting that stu-
dents contribute to "overcrowding, parking, and [leaving] trash strewn on yards and side-
walks" and that "[a]s the student population has increased, and changed, a lot of
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First, these demographic and geographic realities impact the supply
of and the demand for rental housing.92 The lack of "spill-over to
adjacent markets" exacerbates the high demand for rental housing in
Ithaca.93 This lack of spill-over results in a shortage94 of rental hous-
ing in the city because renters have nowhere else to go. Because the
supply does not expand, renters must both pay more for housing and
rent apartments that, given their poor condition, otherwise would be
undesirable, if not unrentable. One apartment developer in Ithaca
even suggested "that most people would describe the apartment build-
ings in Ithaca as 'slums"' because of their substandard appearance. 95
One Cornell Law student conducted her housing search by fax and
later found that the floor plan she had received did not match the
apartment, leaving her "with a small, dark, unequipped living space
ideal for few humans on cold upstate [New York] nights."
96
Second, the attributes of Ithaca's housing market also affect the
local, nonstudent population. Because students usually can afford
higher rent payments, the large student population in Ithaca has led
to an increase in the median rent.97 The City of Ithaca provides the
properties have deteriorated'" (quoting a landlord from the Boston area)). The most dis-
orderly tenants in a student-rich neighborhood are often the students. See id. Students are
more likely to have parties at their apartments, which often result in damage. See, e.g.,
Matt Bai, 2 Landlords Near NU Say They Won't Rent to Fraternities Again, BosToN GLOBE, Apr.
10, 1995, at 13 (reporting that two landlords near Northeastern University whose "houses
were trashed this past week by fraternity members to whom they had leased the properties"
imposed a policy of "[n]o pets, no parties... no frats" (omission in original)). In addi-
tion, because students' stays in Ithaca are brief, students often do more damage to their
apartments than the security deposit covers, forcing the landlord to fix the damage with his
own money. See Matt Ba, Fraternity House Trashed: South End Eviction-Eve Party Causes
$50,000 in Damag BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 1995, at 48 (reporting that an interviewed ten-
ant claimed that "it was common for tenants who are leaving a building to do some amount
of damage").
92 See REGULATORY IssuEs SuB-COMM., supra note 80, at 1.
93 Id.
94 For a description of a shortage as well as its causes and effects, see, for example,
WiLLiAM A. McEACHERN, ECONoMics 63 (1988).
95 Sarah Striffler, Modern Amenities, Location Attract Students to New C-Town Apartments,
CORNELL DAILY SUN, Aug. 25, 1997, at 1 (reporting the comment ofJason Fane, developer
of the newest high-rise apartment building in Ithaca); see also Beth McCarroll, Housing
Search Uncovers Surprises, CORNELL LAw TowER, Sept. 17, 1998, at 1 (noting that several
Cornell Law students "have experienced the general unclean, varmint-ridden, bug-infested
problems that many encounter" in Ithaca).
96 McCarroll, supra note 95 ("Said to be a first floor abode, it was in actuality predomi-
nantly underground, with the only window shaded by a staircase. The square footage was
substantially smaller than stated and the refrigerator was a bar-size mini fridge."). Wash-
ington & Lee University students similarly contend with accommodations such as "the rick-
ety house by the sewage-treatment plant." Atkins, supra note 5, at 16.
97 See CrrV OF ITHACA, supra note 83, at 9 (reporting that Ithaca rent increased by 93%
while the median household income increased by only 72% in the same ten-year period);
see also REGULATORY ISSUES SuB-COMM., supra note 80, at 1 (stating that "[t ] he upward pres-
sure on rents shows no sign of abating in the immediate future"). Students often can
afford to pay a high price for a room in an apartment because they commonly receive
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following two possible explanations for students' ability to pay higher
rent: (1) students often live in groups, which increases their combined
purchasing power, and (2) many students, especially undergraduates,
receive financial support from their families, which typically have
higher median incomes than the national or local average.98 A third
explanation is that students are more willing to pay higher rent be-
cause they make their apartment decisions on a year-to-year basis.99
Savings of twenty dollars per month for a year often do not seem as
important as the same savings on a lease that is five or ten years in
duration. In any event, median rent levels in Ithaca have surpassed
median income levels, meaning that a sizeable portion of the popula-
tion cannot afford rental housing.100 The low vacancy rates also limit
choices and directly influence the supply of rental housing, driving up
rental rates. 10 1 As a result, nonstudent residents with low incomes
must pay over thirty percent of their gross incomes in rent.10 2 The
transient nature of students not only results in higher rents but also
decreases a landlord's incentive to repair his property, causing rental
units to fall more easily into disrepair. 1 3
The unique dynamic of a college town population creates a rental
environment with its own special difficulties. Unlike most American
towns and cities, a majority of the population in college towns is tran-
sient, and a supermajority of this population is renters. These popula-
tion differences combine with geographic isolation to create shortages
and higher rents for the college town renter.10 4 Though this demo-
money either in the form of a loan or from their parents. On the contrary, a family of four
cannot afford the same price because the children do not contribute economically. See
Crrv OF ITHACA, supra note 83, at 9 (indicating that students "can afford to pay $250 apiece
for a 4-bedroom apartment, where as [sic] a family of 5 cannot usually afford $1000 a
month in rent").
98 See Crrv OF ITHACA, supra note 83, at 9.
99 See Mueller, supra note 52, app. c at 286 (question 7) (noting that 85% of the
surveyed tenants in Ann Arbor, Michigan leased their apartment for one year); see also id.
at 265 n.70 (explaining that most student renters want apartments on a short-term basis-
about eight months-because of the length of the school year). In addition, most leases in
Ithaca are either ten or twelve months in duration. See Classified Advertising, CoRNF.LL DAILY
SuN, Feb. 13, 1998, at 27 (listing several apartments available for the coming school year
with either ten- or twelve-month lease lengths).
100 See CrrY oF ITHACA, supra note 83, at 9.
101 See id. at 11.
102 See id
103 Commentators have argued that landlords make repairs "even though they don't
have to" because they fear that "the present tenants will probably move out." Edited Tran-
script of Proceedings of the Liberty Fund, Inc. Seminar on the Common Law History of Landlord-
Tenant Law, 69 CORNEu L. REv. 623, 676 (Timothy P. Terrell ed., 1984) (remarks of Prof.
Peter Aranson). Unfortunately, student tenants probably will move out at the end of the
year anyway, thus dissipating the landlords' incentive to retain their tenants by making
repairs.
104 See REGULATORY IssuEs SuB-CoMM., supra note 80, at 1 ("The upward pressure on
rents shows no sign of abating in the immediate future. The obvious effect of an exacer-
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graphic and geographic situation is unique in today's society, America
has seen it before in the company towns of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
B. Analogy to Company Towns
An analogy to company towns 0 5 sheds light on the relationship
between the university environment and its residents. This analogy
will help describe the experience of living in a college town. Students,
like workers in company towns, not only have no choice but to live in
the college town, but also have limited bargaining power in negotia-
tions over lease provisions.
10 6
First, it is important to define a company town. A company town
is a community "inhabited solely or chiefly by the employees of a sin-
gle company or group of companies which also owns a substantial part
of the real estate and houses.' u0 7 In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, as industry flourished and the need for labor
grew dramatically,10 8 companies often built their towns near their
mines to ensure that the towns were "temporary and isolated in na-
ture,"'0 9 as many college towns are today. One might guess that the
populations were somewhat static in company towns because of the
culture surrounding industrial communitites. One interesting feature
of company towns, however, which also is present in college towns,
bated shortage of rental housing units coupled with a burgeoning population will be
higher rents.").
105 This environment is distinct from an industrial community, which "depend[s] on a
single employer, but [is] developed by private interests." MARGA=R CRAWFORD, BuILDING
THE WORKINGMAN'S PARADISE 1 (1995). That distinction has no relevance to this discus-
sion. The demarcations between actual company towns and mere industrial communities
have significance for the design and dynamic of the town. This Note, however, focuses on
factors that apply equally to both environments. For example, in both cases, the commu-
nity associated with the industry lives in housing near the town. The reasons why they are
unable to leave the surrounding area are also similar.
106 At first glance, specific differences exist between company towns and college towns,
but these considerations do not change this Note's analysis. For example, unlike the com-
pany of the company town, universities seldom own all of the housing in the college town,
but this difference does not undermine the thrust of this Note's argument because the
housing characteristics in both types of towns are similar, regardless of ownership.
107 Horace B. Davis, Company Towns, in 4 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 119,
119 (Edwin R.A. Seligman et al. eds., 1931).
108 See, e.g., CRANDALL A. SHiuFLErTr, COAL TowNs 68 (1991) (articulating that "coal
companies complained of labor shortages throughout the period between 1900 and
1920").
109 See Kevin P. Stein, Company Housing Between 1880-1930: Its Evolution as a
Weapon Against Labor 20 (1986) (unpublished senior honors thesis, Cornell University-
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations) (on file with the Cornell Univer-
sity Library). The unique characteristics of company towns existed because of the tempo-
rary nature of mines, which often did not exist longer than 20 years, see id., but one
reasonably might argue that the isolation of the mining areas also created a disincentive
for major housing development.
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was the fluidity of the population." 0 The shortage of workers re-
quired that the mine owners attract and retain laborers;"' however,
companies often struggled in the realm of worker retention."
2
Company towns began to decline in large part because of the au-
tomobile." 3 Because most workers' financial well-being improved,
they had more liquid income and could purchase cars with install-
ment buying." 4 Indeed, the increased availability of inexpensive
automobiles meant that workers became less dependent on housing
near the company. They had the flexibility to move farther away from
their work, thereby increasing, their housing options." 5 The college
student generally lacks this choice, however, because even if he owns a
car, he may not be able to obtain a parking permit." 6 Without a park-
ing permit, the student must live within walking distance of school
110 See SHIFmsTr, supra note 108, at 76 (explaining that "there was a big turnover of
men because some would mine in the winter and farm in the spring and fall" or work in
the mines "on a part-time basis").
111 See id. at 67-80 (detailing the shortage of labor and the mine owners' correspond-
ing efforts to attract new laborers).
112 See id. at 77 (noting that companies often would pay workers' transportation costs,
only to have many of them leave before starting work). The transient characteristic of
laborers is an important point. Shifflett gives the example of one company town-
Stonega, Pennsylvania-where one-fourth of the labor force "turned over each year." Id.
Somewhat coincidentally, this is approximately the same turnover rate that a college or
university experiences due to graduation. Of course, one striking difference is that 25% of
the students leave the university each year because of one natural form of attrition-gradu-
ation-whereas miners left company towns for a variety of reasons, including, most impor-
tantly, "economic conditions." Id. at 78. As of yet, no records that accurately document
the reasons for the transience of workers have surfaced, but applicants for Stonega Com-
pany jobs listed the reasons for their leaving previous work as "wanted a change," "left
voluntarily," or "no reason." Id.
113 Other causes include the slowing demand for coal, see id. at 199 (detailing the
decline in coal demand due to shifts to alternate fuel sources, labor strife, and the Great
Depression), and the New Deal, see CRAWFORD, supra note 105, at 202-04 ("If company
towns ... declined during the 1920s, the New Deal dealt them a more serious blow.").
114 See CRAWFORD, supra note 105, at 201.
115 See id. ("Visitors to company towns during the 1920s reported finding numerous
houses left vacant by employees who had moved away and now commuted to work.").
116 According to Cornell Parking and Commuter Services, only 2248 students have
permits to park cars on campus. See Telephone Interview with Cornell University Parking
and Commuter Services Department, Ithaca, N.Y. (Jan. 19, 1997). Moreover, in 1997 Cor-
nell issued only 1071 transit passes to commuting students. See E-mail from Carol Schusler,
Computer Systems Coordinator for the Department of Transportation and Mail Services,
Cornell University, to author (July 20, 1998) (on file with author). According to the Un-
dergraduate Registrar and Graduate School Registration Reports of Cornell University, the
school had 18,428 students enrolled in 1997 in the schools on the Ithaca campus. See
Undergraduate Registrar and Graduate School Registration Reports, Total Cornell Enroll-
ment: Undergraduate, Graduate, Professional (last modified Nov. 1997) <http://www.ipr.cor-
nell.edu?FactBook/Enrollment/Total/Total>. Given these data, it is inconceivable that all
commuting students could obtain a permit for campus parking. If a student cannot drive a




and cannot move to the surrounding communities."17
Company towns and college towns share several similarities. First,
the center of activity for those living in the town is the company or the
university. In Ithaca, most residents are students,"18 and a large por-
tion of the nonstudent residents work for either Cornell or Ithaca Col-
lege." 9 Furthermore, the majority of the students and residents must
live in Ithaca because of the shortage of available housing in nearby
areas.' 20 Moreover, the public transportation system in Ithaca does
not cater to students, making it even more difficult for them to live in
outlying areas.' 21 Second, students, like the workers living in com-
pany towns, do not stay in the area for an extended period of time.
22
Students' transiency operates on two levels: they often move from year
to year,' 23 and they only stay at the university for an average of four
years. Third, the market is so demand-oriented that property owners
in both company towns and college towns share the same small incen-
tive to care about their tenants.124
In the final analysis, both company towns and college towns ex-
emplify a failed rental market in which the tenants have relatively neg-
ligible bargaining power vis-a-vis the landlords. In both cases, the
implicit conditions force the workers or students to live in the town.125
Because of this necessity, residents must accept lease provisions that
heavily favor the landlord, 26 not unlike the current leases in Ith-
aca.127 Although the analogy between company towns and college
towns is imperfect, it does illustrate the unique problems that face the
isolated, centrally dependent communities surrounding universities
and colleges.
117 See REGULATORY ISSUES SUB-COMM., supra note 80, at 1 (detailing the lack of spill-
over in the Ithaca area).
118 See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
119 Se supra note 78.
120 See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
121 See Interview with Kathleen Decker, supra note 9.
122 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
123 See supra note 99.
124 See SHIFFLE-rT, supra note 108, at 161 (noting that oppression existed in company
towns in the form of "the script system, monopolistic company-store practices, price-goug-
ing,... [and] eviction from company houses").
125 See REGULATORY ISSUES SUB-COMM., supra note 80, at 1 ("The relative isolation of
Ithaca from other cities concentrates changes in supply and demand within a metropoli-
tan-area housing market, three-fifths of which is within Ithaca City limits.").
126 See Stein, supra note 109, at 61 (detailing the landlord-friendly lease provisions in
company towns, which for example, "required only 'one day's written notice' to vacate the
premises" (quoting a lease from one company town)).




TYPICAL FoRM LEASES WREAK HAVOC IN THE ITHACA
RENTAL MARKET
While the courts have turned to contract law to govern modem
landlord-tenant relationships, landlords and their lawyers have made
the terms and conditions of leases more comprehensive and complex.
With this increased reliance on contract, the lease has come to em-
body more than just a conveyance of land and the corresponding obli-
gation to pay rent; 28 it has become the essence of the landlord-tenant
relationship. 12 9 The proliferation of contract theory with respect to
leases has undermined the tenants' struggle for equal bargaining
power.'30 Although the occasional landlord may take the time and
effort to design his own lease, most often he will use a form lease,' 3 '
which inhibits the ability of tenants to bargain effectively.' 3
2
128 See Lesar, supra note 23, § 3.11, at 202 (noting that modem leases contain provi-
sions concerning repairs, taxes, insurance, and use); see also ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERI-
CAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT, at v (1980) (commenting on the law's recent
"realization that the modem lease is essentially a bilateral contract, not merely a convey-
ance of an interest in real property"). Some commentators have argued that the recent
reliance on contract law to interpret leases is unnecessary and even harmful. See, e.g., Ed-
ward Chase, The Property-Contract Theme in Landlord and Tenant Law: A Critical Commentary on
Schoshinski's American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 13 RUTGERs L.J. 189 (1982).
129 But cf. 1 FRiEDMAN, supra note 38, § 1.1, at 12 (noting that states have not com-
pletely abandoned the common law's emphasis on the property aspects of the lease and
advising that they not do so because "[iut would be difficult to track down all the desirable
rules of landlord-tenant law that might disappear if the conceptual underpinning of the
common law were suddenly swept away").
130 See Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the Common Law That
Give Security of Tenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 681, 712 (1994) ("Even with the
establishment of the warranty of habitability, the contract theory of leases made no signifi-
cant adjustment in the bargaining positions of the landlord and tenant with regard to the
particular terms of the lease ... [, which] remained favorable to the landlord.").
131 See Stephen R. Bell, Note, Standard Form Leases in Wisconsin, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 583,
583-84. This Note uses the term "form lease" to describe a commercially produced lease
that is available to landlords. Although "IIthere is no single 'standard' or 'official' form
lease," they often contain similar provisions, which "justifies referring to commercially-
printed leases collectively." Bentley, supra note 41, at 841. Almost any widely used lease
can constitute a form lease, but one of the most pervasive is the Blumberg Law Blank
Publishers, Inc. No. X327, published in 1968. See id. at 841 n.18.
132 See infra Part IILA.2. EmilyJane Goodman suggests that all leases are "one-sided."
GOODMAN, supra note 17, at 41. She also warns renters:
Do not be deceived by thinking that the lease is fair and just because of
the endorsements it carries. The printed form may say "approved by the
Chicago Real Estate Board" or "the Bar Association of the City of Spring-
field" or "Boston Property Owners Association." These endorsements mean
that the document has been approved by the professional real-estate peo-
ple; it also gives the utmost protection to the landlord. These endorse-
ments often convey to the tenant the erroneous impression that the
association is objective and fair and that the lease is a document protecting




A. The Economics of the Form Lease in Ithaca
Contracts professors often preach that the law of contract embod-
ies the "bargain theory,"1 33 which teaches that two parties at arm's
length negotiate to exchange consideration.134 Any first-year Cornell
Law student who rents an apartment in Ithaca, however, will swear
that leases do not derive from bargain.'3 5 Form leases affect the oper-
ation of contract by reducing the ability of tenants to bargain and by
giving them an incentive not to do so.
1. The Rental Market in Ithaca Fails
The unique characteristics of college towns like Ithaca impact the
functioning of their rental markets. Most importantly, the economic
model degenerates into "monopolistic competition" in which the
landlords manage their enterprises with virtual impunity.'3 6 The high
demand in the rental market makes it improbable that they will expe-
rience any negative repercussions from raised rents or dilapidated
conditions. Moreover, the student renter is less likely to bargain and
more likely to exhibit rational ignorance and undue optimism, which
further benefits the landlord. 3 7
The hallmark of a market economy is the free market system, in
which supply and demand interact to produce equilibrium. 38 Capi-
talism assumes that people are "rational maximizer[s]" who will re-
spond to incentives in their surroundings.13 9 It further presumes that
when one's surrounding conditions change, one will alter his behav-
ior to react to the change in a way that improves his situation. 40 An
example of this common "price system"' 4' involves baseball tickets:
when the Cubs play on a sunny Saturday, bleacher tickets sell for thirty
dollars each; when it rains, they cost five dollars.' 42 On a sunny day,
133 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRAcTs § 2.2 (2ded. 1990).
134 See, e.g., Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415,
421 (N.Y. 1995) ("Freedom of contract prevails in an arm's length transaction between
sophisticated parties .... and in the absence of countervailing public policy concerns
there is no reason to relieve them of the consequences of their bargain.").
135 See Slawson, supra note 44, at 529 (remarking that "it]he contracting still imagined
by courts and law teachers as typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the
language of their entire agreement, is no longer of much more than historical
importance").
136 See infra text accompanying notes 155-65.
'37 See infra Part III.B.
138 See, e.g., McEAcHERN, supra note 94, at 61-62 (demonstrating how a hypothetical
milk market reaches equilibrium).
139 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 4 (5th ed. 1998).
140 See id.
141 See generally STANLEY FISCHER ET AL., ECONOMICs 41 (2d ed. 1988) (describing the
.price system" as governing "decisions about resource allocation ... in which supply and
demand interact in numerous markets for goods and services").
142 At the box office, the 1999 face value of a bleacher ticket will be $15. Bleacher
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the uncovered bleacher seats are more attractive to the Wrigleyville
population; therefore, the demand for the limited supply of seats is
higher. This example illustrates a shortage of seats.143 Because of the
high demand, prices rise, but the supply cannot expand. 44 This in-
ability to increase supply renders equilibrium unattainable.
A day at Wrigley Field markedly differs from renting housing.
Most importantly, if the ticket price becomes too expensive for the
Cubs fans in Wrigleyville, they can skip the ballpark and listen to the
game on the radio or watch it on television. 145 By contrast, if the
rental prices rise too high for the residents of a college town, they
have no alternatives.146 Because of the scarcity of quality housing in
Ithaca, the local population must pay high rent for necessary shel-
ter.147 In other words, the housing market in a college town exhibits
what economists call "inelastic demand,' 148 primarily because housing
is a necessity rather than a luxury.149 As the price of rental units in-
creases, the demand remains high,150 enabling landlords to raise their
rents without diminishing their ability to rent.
151
An economist may argue that this situation merely would prompt
the system's rational actors to build more apartment units to boost the
supply to meet the demand.152 Unfortunately, in Ithaca the only re-
seats at Wrigley Field, the Cubs' home ballpark, are usually sunny and are exposed to the
prevailing westerly winds.
143 For a description of a shortage as well as its causes and effects, see, for example,
MCEACHERN, supra note 94, at 63.
144 See id. at 62-63 (describing how inelastic supply results in surpluses and shortages);
see also FISCHER ET AL., supra note 141, at 46-47 (describing the same relational event but
using Chicago fishermen instead of the Chicago Cubs). Incidentally, regardless of the
weather at Wrigley Field, the fishermen are more likely to win the pennant.
145 WGN's television and radio stations broadcast almost every Cubs game throughout
the baseball season, giving fans who are unable to afford tickets at the street prices an
opportunity to catch all the action.
146 See REGULATORY IssuEs SuB-COMM., supra note 80, at 1 (describing the "captive stu-
dent population").
147 See Crrv oF ITHACA, supra note 83, at 11 (describing how the low vacancy rates and
high constant demand has resulted in "high rental rates").
148 E.g., McFACHERN, supra note 94, at 428-29 & exhibit 4 (illustrating that a "perfectly
inelastic demand" results in a market in which "price changes do not affect quantity
demanded").
149 See id. at 432 ("The demand for necessities will be less elastic than the demand for
luxuries.").
150 Of course, at some point the rental prices will become so high that people will have
to live in public-assisted housing because they will not be able to afford any other apart-
ment. Cf. id. at 429 (explaining that even with perfectly inelastic demand, a price change
must stay within a "realistic range of possible prices").
151 One can analogize to the rich diabetic who needs insulin to stay alive and will pay
almost any price for it. See id. at 428. Because he needs insulin to live, an increase in price
will not affect his demand for it.
152 See, e.g., FiscHER ET AL., supra note 141, at 46 (explaining the movement to equilib-




cent housing developments, which have been near campus, have been
expensive, multiunit high rises, which only wealthy students can af-
ford. 53 As Kathleen Decker of the Ithaca Building Department ex-
plained, this type of development inflates the entire rental market; the
other landlords realize that they too can charge high rent because the
market will bear high-priced apartments.
54
How can this be? Ithaca exemplifies a special market that oper-
ates as a system of "monopolistic competition."' 55 This condition oc-
curs when a large number of sellers-landlords in this case-compete
with each other, but still exhibit "some of the characteristics of a mo-
nopolist."' 56 In the Ithaca market, landlords may differentiate their
products in various ways, such as location or quality, and consumers
remain willing to pay a high price to secure the more attractive
product.15
7
The competition in Ithaca more closely resembles a monopoly
than perfect competition. 5 8 The landlord in this market has an in-
centive to distinguish his property from others. Wealthy renters, such
as those college students who receive money from their parents or
student loans, will pay more than the average price for higher quality
housing. 59 Though monopolistic competition typically exists in mar-
153 See Striffler, supra note 95 (explaining that the new high-rise apartments in Ithaca
with "'Manhattan prices,'" "target[ ] 'prosperous families' who can afford to have their
sons and daughters live in the building").
154 See Interview with Kathleen Decker, supra note 9; see also Crry OF ITHAcA, supra note
83, at 9 (describing how the high spending power of some students drives up the prices for
all tenants). In addition, students that cannot afford to live near campus move to nearby
neighborhoods, increasing rents. See REGULATORY ISSUES SUB-COMM., supra note 80, at 4
(explaining that "[s]tudents who are unable to attain or unable to afford units in close
proximity to the campus spill into outlying neighborhoods and place further upward pres-
sure on rents").
155 McEACHERN, supra note 94, at 559. Monopolistic competition theory lies between
the theories of monopoly and perfect competition. See id. at 558-59. The term describes
an economic theory in which a significant number of competitors act independently with-
out concern as to how their competition will react to changes in price or output. See id. at
559. A reasonable view of this theory might be one in which the market lies on a contin-
uum between monopoly and perfect competition. Each system exhibits qualities of both,
but each can be more monopolistic than competitive or more competitive than
monopolistic.
156 Id. at 560.
157 See id. at 559-61 (explaining that even though mini-convenience stores often charge
higher prices than larger stores, customers are willing to pay more because convenience
stores "are often nearer and stay open later").
158 But see Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes
and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 517, 578 (1984) (arguing "that the rental housing
industry is intensely competitive" and that "few landlords wield any significant degree of
monopoly power").
159 See McEACHERN, supra note 94, at 566 & exhibit 3; see also Striffier, supra note 95
(describing that owners of new apartment buildings "target[ I" wealthy students who will
pay more for modern accommodations).
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kets with high demand elasticity,160 a college town exhibits very inelas-
tic demand, much like a monopoly.161 Therefore, when a developer
builds new, higher quality buildings, like the new high rises in Ithaca,
students pay more for apartments in them.162 When this development
occurs, the landlords with lower quality units raise their rents on the
basis of the following two facts: (1) the market will bear higher rents,
as the demand for higher quality apartments demonstrates, and (2) a
rent increase will not lower the demand.
College towns do not exhibit the traditional price system 163 that
one might find in other rental markets. Because of the housing
shortage and the inelastic demand in Ithaca, the rental market oper-
ates as a system of monopolistic competition.'r As landlords differen-
tiate their units by accentuating quality and location, they are able to
charge high rents and still acquire tenants, regardless of whether they
make improvements to the apartments and of whether the supply of
rental units increases.
2. Bargaining for Terms Under a Form Lease
By creating contracts of adhesion, 65 the use of form leases makes
160 See McEAcHERN, supra note 94, at 561 ("The demand curve faced by a firm in mo-
nopolistic competition is highly, though not perfectly, elastic.").
161 See generally id, (describing the monopolist's demand curve as less elastic than that
of the typical monopolistic competitor).
162 See id. at 566-67 & exhibit 3 (noting that in a system of monopolistic competition,
the buyer is willing to pay more for the higher quality products); see also Striffier, supra note
95 (indicating that the new high rise in Ithaca attracts "prosperous families").
163 See supra text accompanying notes 141-44 (describing the Chicago Cubs' ticket sales
as an example of the traditional price system).
164 Even if the rental market in college towns is not a system of monopolistic competi-
tion, an increase in supply does not improve the rental market for tenants, as the inelastic
demand principle illustrates. If demand is less elastic, then as the price increases demand
will decrease only marginally. See McEAcHERN, supra note 94, at 421 & exhibit 1. Similarly,
if the supply increases, the price drops only marginally, leaving the renters in essentially
the same position that they were before the supply increase.
165 Form leases provide perfect examples of contracts of adhesion. Contracts of adhe-
sion share with form leases the following seven characteristics:
(1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that
contains many terms and clearly purports to be a contract.
(2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the
transaction.
(3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the
type represented by the form and enters into these transactions as a matter
of routine.
(4) The form is presented to the adhering party with the representa-
tion that, except perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term),
the drafting party will enter into the transaction only on the terms con-
tained in the document. This representation may be explicit or may be
implicit in the situation, but it is understood by the adherent.
(5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to
bargaining, the document is signed by the adherent
1999]
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it difficult for tenants to bargain effectively.16 6 A landlord usually of-
fers a form lease on a take-it-or-leave-it basis without providing the
potential tenant any chance to negotiate. 167 When bargaining occurs,
it invariably focuses on a few tangential provisions, such as whether
the landlord will repaint the apartment or whether the tenant can
have a dog.' 68 Thus, the use of form leases precludes the possibility of
bargaining from equal positions.
Some argue that this type of "bargaining" consitutes a legitimate
use of the market. Judge Richard Posner argues that the use of a form
lease simply enables the landlord to avoid the formidable costs of ne-
gotiating separate agreements with each tenant.169 He acknowledges
a possible "sinister explanation": the landlord wants to force the ten-
ant to accept his terms by giving her no choice.' 70 But Judge Posner
also suggests that a competing landlord will offer more attractive
terms that in turn will force a change in the rental market.'
7 '
This sinister explanation accurately describes the situation that
occurs when parties employ a standard form contract. 7 2 Certainly,
parties often utilize standard form contracts outside the realm of
apartment rental.' 73 These contracts resemble form leases because
parties that have strong bargaining power are more likely to use form
(6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type repre-
sented by the form-few, at least, in comparison with the drafting party.
(7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction
considered as a whole is the payment of money.
Rakoff, supra note 44, at 1177 (footnote omitted).
166 See Street v. Davis, 542 N.Y.S.2d 968, 969 (Civ. Ct. 1989) (noting that a residential
tenant "cannot truly negotiate these contracts as an equal"); Mueller, supra note 52, at 247
("Disparity in bargaining power between parties to standard-form contracts is a universally
recognized problem."). The disadvantage primarily affects the tenant, especially because
lease forms function to benefit the landlord. See Berger, supra note 71, at 791 n.2. Further-
more, landlords often amend form leases in reaction to changes in the law. See id. at 792
n.3.
167 See Berger, supra note 71, at 791; see also Street 542 N.Y.S.2d at 969 (noting that
residential tenants "are at risk when entering into contracts drawn up by others and
presented to them on a take or leave basis").
168 See David Vance Kirby, Contract Law and the Form Lease: Can Contract Law Provide the
Answer?, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 204, 232 (1976) ("The bargained contract between a residential
tenant and landlord rarely fills more than a paragraph, often containing no more than the
price and duration of the tenancy. Sometimes the landlord will promise to redecorate;
sometimes the tenant will promise to have no pets." (footnote omitted)).
169 See POSNER, supra note 139, at 127 (describing this economic relationship between
landlord and tenant in terms of sellers and buyers).
170 Id.
171 See id.
172 See Bell, supra note 131, at 583-84.
173 See generally Rakoff, supra note 44, at 1220-29 (describing several situations in which
form contracts or contracts of adhesion are used).
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contracts. 74 The weaker party typically has a limited ability to find
more desirable terms, either because the particular market functions
as a monopoly or because each competitor in the market uses the
same clauses. 175 In these situations, the tenant lacks "freedom" of
contract because the landlord dictates terms that the tenant likely
neither understands nor wants.176 In addition, the tenant often be-
lieves that the landlord immediately will deny any request or that the
tenant's own bargaining position is too weak to change the landlord's
position.'
77
The form lease creates a circumstance in which the market will
not change. Judge Posner premises his argument, which one com-
mentator labelled "the 'market for terms' hypothesis,"' 78 on the no-
tion that haggling in the specific circumstance is not necessary
because market competition will force a seller to alter her standard
form contract to respond to systemic changes.179 He suggests that
these changes also will occur in a monopoly because the buyers will
read the contracts before deciding whether to make a purchase.
180 If
a contract contains undesirable terms, the argument goes, fewer peo-
ple will purchase, which in turn will force the whole industry to
change course and amend the standard form it uses.'
8 1
The market-for-terms hypothesis does not apply to the landlord-
tenant context primarily because, unlike the imaginary widget, hous-
ing is actually "a necessity of life."' 8 2 If the tenant reads and dislikes
terms in the unattractive form lease, he probably cannot alter them,
183
leaving him only the option of finding another landlord. This propo-
174 See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract
43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943) ("Standard contracts are typically used by enterprises
with strong bargaining power.").
175 See id.
176 See id. (denouncing form contracts as having "terms whose consequences are often
understood only in a vague way, if at all").
177 See Mueller, supra note 52, app. c at 295 (question 34) (reporting that of the sur-
veyed tenants who had never bargained with a landlord, 35% did not bargain because they
"thought that such a request would have been immediately denied" and 43% did not think
they had a "strong enough bargaining position to obtain any concession").
178 Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of
Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391, 428 (1990)..
179 See PosER, supra note 139, at 127 ("If one seller offers unattractive terms, a com-
peting seller, wanting sales for himself, will offer more attractive terms.").
180 See id. at 128 (arguing that "a consumer facing a monopolized market has a real
choice, and he will want it to be an informed choice").
181 See id. (asserting that the effect of monopoly "is to reduce the demand for a prod-
uct, implying that some customers prefer to do without it rather than pay the monopoly
price").
182 Id. ("The fact that a product is monopolized does not make it a necessity of life.").
183 See Slawson, supra note 44, at 530 ("Even the fastidious few who take the time to
read the standard form may be helpless to vary it. The form may be part of an offer which
the consumer has no reasonable alternative but to accept.").
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sition would be simple, except that "the landlord down the street with
equally inviting space uses an equally uninviting and unnegotiable
[lease] form. 1 84 Regardless of whether another landlord actually
does offer a different lease, the prevalence of form leases likely will
lead a tenant to believe that all landlords offer the same form.8 5
Moreover, because tenants generally do not read the standardized
contract, 186 they probably will not make decisions with its terms in
mind.187 Furthermore, the landlord himself may be both unaware of
how the lease works' 88 and ignorant of the law. This ignorance means
that he will not know that he should change any of the lease terms.
Indeed, he may not eliminate any of them because of fear that he will
jeopardize the lease's effectiveness. Therefore, it is unlikely that mar-
ket forces will motivate landlords in college towns to alter their lease
provisions.
B. Student Renters' Impact on the Rental Market
1. Rational Ignorance in Ithaca
Even if the market-for-terms hypothesis could apply to a college
town rental market, the rational actors in Ithaca still would not bar-
gain extensively. An economic system, like a rental market, ideally
includes rational buyers and sellers.' 8 9 These rational actors often
must make choices in the face of uncertainty. They will make the de-
cision that is best for them by utilizing the "rational-choice" model to
choose the option that "maximizes [their own] subjective expected
utility."190 Under an assumption that they are rational actors, renters
184 Berger, supra note 71, at 791.
185 See Rabin, supra note 158, at 583 ("Because of the widespread use of printed lease
forms, a prospective tenant is fully justified in suspecting that most landlords will be offer-
ing identical lease clauses on identical lease forms.").
186 See Mueller, supra note 52, at 256 (reporting data from a tenant study through
which he found that only 57% of the tenant sample read their leases when they rented for
the first time and only 50% read their subsequent leases); Slawson, supra note 44, at 530
("Indeed, in the usual case, the consumer never even reads the form, or reads it only after
he has become bound by its terms."); Hasen, supra note 178, at 430 (pointing out that
"[b] oth the Restatement and 'law and economics' adherents recognize that adhesion con-
tracts are neither read nor understood").
187 See Hasen, supra note 178, at 428 ("If [tenants] do not read the standardized terms,
... they will be unaware that one [landlord]'s standard contract is better than another's.").
188 See id. at 429 (noting "that [tenants] may not be the only ones unaware of the terms
of the form contract; the [landlords] themselves may have the contracts drafted by lawyers
... [who do not] inform[ ] the [landlord] of the contract's contents").
189 See McEACHERN, supra note 94, at 8 (describing rational self-interest as "[a] key
economic assumption"); POSNER, supra note 139, at 3-4 (discussing "[r]ational maximiza-
tion"); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REv. 211, 211-12 (1995) (arguing that the bargain principle relies on the notion that par-
ties "are normally the best judges of their own utility" and act to maximize this utility
through their promises).
190 Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 213.
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often disrupt the ability of the rental market to operate as most other
markets do because they act with "rational ignorance."' 91 Form leases
encourage tenants to act with rational ignorance with respect to lease
provisions because these leases increase the expense of bargaining for
terms.
a. Wat Is Rational Ignorance?
Some economists assert that actors will remain ignorant about
some information because doing so benefits them. These economists
begin with the premise that actors normally will make rational deci-
sions,192 but may violate the standard rational-choice model because
of the "limits of cognition."19 3 Professor Melvin Eisenberg advocates a
"bounded rationality" model for decision making, in which an actor
utilizes limited information to make a rational choice.194 Because of
191 McEACHERN, supra note 94, at 792. Rational ignorance means that people choose
to ignore information when "[t]he costs of acquiring and acting on such information are
typically greater than any expected benefits." Id For example:
The gain to a citizen-taxpayer from obtaining a particular political out-
come in an election is equal to the difference between the value to the
taxpayer of obtaining his preferred outcome and the value of obtaining his
non-preferred outcome, multiplied by the probability that a change in an
individual's vote will alter the outcome of the election. Because this
probability is very low, it often does not pay for voters to acquire
information.
Jonathan R. Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74
CoRNELL. L. Rxv. 43, 47 n.17 (1988).
192 Professor McEachem discusses the amount of time and information required to
make a rational choice. See McEAcHERN, supra note 94, at 9. For example, second-year law
students typically consider the time required to make the rational choice of where to work.
They talk to friends, relatives, professors, classmates, and associates in law firms. Their goal
is to digest and to process all of the information available to them. Cf id. (articulating the
same point with the example of a student choosing a college). Students will pay others to
gather the information for them; in fact, many buy books about the various firms. Cf id.
(same). As McEachern points out, this decision takes "time and money, not to mention
sheer aggravation and anxiety." Id.
193 Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 213. Professor Melvin Eisenberg suggests that deci-
sion makers have certain "cognitive abilities," such as knowing alternatives or prices, that
they may use to make decisions. Id. "Limits of cognition," such as rational ignorance,
force the decision maker to forego his cognitive abilities when he makes a decision. Id.
194 IdM at 214 (claiming that "human rationality is normally bounded by limited infor-
mation and limited information processing"). Melvin Eisenberg argues that there are two
degrees of rational decision making- optimal substantive decisions and satisfactory substan-
tive decisions. See id. An optimal substantive decision exists in a world in which the costs of
searching for and processing information are zero and in which humans can process infor-
mation perfectly. See id. In such a scenario, an actor facing a decision would search for all
relevant information, process that information, and make the optimal substantive decision.
See id. Because of the formidable costs of gathering information and the fallibility of the
human mind, however, most actors only aspire to make a satisfactory substantive decision.
See id. According to Eisenberg, the distinction between these types of rational choices
exists in "the difference between searching a haystack to find the sharpest needle in it and
searching the haystack to find a needle sharp enough to sew with." Id. (quoting JAMEs G.
MARCH & HERBERT A. SIMON, ORGANIZATIONS 140-41 (1958) (internal quotation marks
1999]
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the costs of ascertaining information, actors do not always obtain the
necessary information to make informed decisions. 195 Instead, they
"make decisions in a state of rational ignorance of [the] alternatives
and consequences that could have been discovered and considered if
search and processing had continued.'1 96 Actors recognize the costs
of acquiring and processing the information needed to make more
accurate decisions and rationally decide not to bear them. Thus, their
ignorance is rational, despite the resulting uninformed decisions.' 97
The utilization of form contracts creates an environment in
which "rational ignorance plays a particularly powerful role."'98 The
resource costs of making an informed decision with respect to a form
contract are extremely high.' 99 Form contracts often contain many
legal terms, the language of which confuses laypeople. 200 To execute
a form contract safely, a layperson would have to pay an attorney to
review it, further increasing the transaction costs and limiting the
form contract's efficiency.201 Indeed, even an attorney would not
omitted)). Some commentators have deemed this phenomenon of rational ignorance
"satisficing." David M. Grether et al., The Irrelevance of Information Overload: An Analysis of
Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 277, 279 (1986) ("To optimize is to choose the best
from the full set of market choices; to satisfice is to do as well as one can, given the
circumstances.").
195 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 215. Consumers engage in this type of rational
ignorance decision making either "by (a) failing to choose the best when considerable
product diversity exists, because the costs of acquiring information preclude consumers
from inspecting the full market choice set; or (b) failing to choose the best when the costs
of processing information preclude consumers from fully exploiting an optimal search strat-
egy." Grether et al., supra note 194, at 279.
196 Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 215.
197 See id. at 216. An example of factoring information costs into the decision-making
process is as follows: when "a piece of legislation will cost a taxpayer $50.00, and the net
cost of obtaining information about the effects of the legislation . . . are greater than
$50.00, no rational taxpayer will obtain the information necessary to begin to affect legisla-
tive outcomes." Macey, supra note 191, at 47. Professor Macey describes this type of deci-
sion making as "rational ignorance." Id. at 47 n.17.
198 Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 241; see also Rabin, supra note 158, at 582 (noting that
in form leases "[tihe key factor.., is the existence of heavy transaction and information
costs").
199 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 241 (noting that to understand adequately a form
contract, the signor must learn, which "will often be unduly costly," new legal terms, which
have meanings that are "often ... inaccessible to laypersons" because form contracts "are
often written in exceedingly technical prose").
200 See id. The prototypical form contract containing many confusing legal terms is the
insurance contract. See id. One can use the same rationale to assess these types of con-
tracts in the examination of form leases. See supra Part IIIA (describing form leases as
highly technical and very confusing). This Note makes no distinction between a form lease
and other types of form contracts.
201 See Hasen, supra note 178, at 429. Of course, most tenants do not take their leases
to attorneys prior to signing them. See Mueller, supra note 52, app. c at 286 (questions 4 &
5) (noting that 94% of the surveyed tenants did not consult an attorney prior to signing




parse every inch of a form contract when he endeavors to "rent a car,
purchase an airline ticket, enter a parking garage, or sign a car loan
agreement or apartment lease."20 2 Moreover, the dynamics of renting
make signing a lease a unique contracting experience: renters usually
spend days searching for an apartment to rent, find a few that appeal
to them, and see the leases only after they have chosen the apartment
they want.203 This time-consuming process makes it unlikely that rent-
ers will shop for favorable lease terms.20 4
The nature of the rental market makes rational ignorance even
more likely.20 5 To make informed choices in light of the confusing
terms of form leases,206 a tenant would have to both search the lease
for illegal terms, which often exist within the fine print, and under-
stand those terms. This process would consume too much time. In-
stead, the tenant tends to sign the lease as it stands, remaining
ignorant of its terms.207 In so doing, the tenant will have agreed to
the unenforceable provisions.208
The theory of rational ignorance also hampers the ability of par-
ties to bargain. Tenants often do not bargain because they assume
202 Hasen, supra note 178, at 429. But see MCEACHERN, supra note 94, at 792 (arguing
that consumers do not choose to be rationally ignorant "about decisions they make in
private markets [for personal products] because they benefit directly from the knowledge
acquired").
203 See Rabin, supra note 158, at 583 (explaining that during the apartment shopping
experience, a potential tenant "rarely sees a written lease" until "he finally decides on an
apartment").
204 See id. ("At this point, the prospective tenant has no ready means of shopping for
lease terms. He does not know, and cannot readily find out, what types of leases other
landlords are offering.").
205 See Kuklin, supra note 41, at 857 ("[I]t can be pointed out that it typically is rational
to sign the agreement without full comprehension.... [T]he information costs and the
difficulty, even futility, of dickering over the take-it-or-leave-it contract often outweigh the
advantage of the potential revision ... ."); Rabin, supra note 158, at 582-83 (detailing the
"heavy transaction and information costs" of lease signing).
206 See supra Part I.B.
207 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 243; Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer
Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World 24 GA. L. REV. 583, 600 (1990)
("[T]he benefit to be derived from acquiring adequate knowledge of contract terms is
usually low and is likely to be far exceeded by the significant costs of acquiring that infor-
mation. It is, therefore, rational for even a conscientious consumer to pay little, if any,
attention to subordinate contract terms."). Professor Eisenberg describes the thought pro-
cess of the rational consumer as follows:
Faced with preprinted terms whose effect the form taker knows he will find
difficult or impossible to fully understand, which involve risks that probably
will never mature, which are unlikely to be worth the cost of search and
processing, and which probably aren't subject to revision in any event, a
rational form taker will typically decide to remain ignorant of the
preprinted terms.
Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 243.
208 See Hasen, supra note 178, at 430; see also supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text




that landlords will not negotiate in return, regardless of the validity of
the tenants' concern.2 09 Commentators, like Judge Posner, suggest
that competition will spur market forces, causing landlords to include
more favorable terms in their form leases.210 Judge Posner's conclu-
sion works only if a large number of renters are willing to scrutinize
the forms for favorable terms.211 Renters rarely engage in that type of
scrutiny because of the time and energy investment required to com-
prehend, compare, and reject form lease terms. 212
Even worse for the renter, Judge Posner's competitive environ-
ment likely would decrease the number of favorable provisions in
standard form leases.215 For example, landlords typically compete for
tenants by lowering rents or by giving perks, such as waiving the last
month's rent.214 Because renters only consider certain terms when
they look for an apartment, landlords have an incentive to make those
particular terms attractive. They correspondingly offset these terms,
however, by making other terms unattractive, which results in an in-
creased total cost to the renter.215 Suppose potential tenants always
209 See Meyerson, supra note 207, at 599-600 ("Whatever benefit might be derived by
the consumer who accurately understands a contract term must be further discounted by
the high transaction costs of altering the term or finding a seller with a preferred term.
The informed consumer knows that the seller probably will refuse to bargain." (footnote
omitted)). Landlords typically do not bargain because their costs in altering their leases
for one tenant exceed any possible gains, so the rational landlord will risk losing that par-
ticular, abberant tenant to avoid "losing the cost savings of standardized forms." Id. at 600;
see also Mueller, supra note 52, at 264-65 (noting that for the small number of surveyed
tenants who attempted to bargain with their landlords, most met refusals or only received
slight modifications of their leases). Furthermore, in this captive-buyer market, another
ignorant tenant probably will be willing to lease the apartment.
210 See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
211 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 243 (arguing that "competition will not have this
effect unless a significant number of form takers participate in this search").
212 See id. at 243-44; see also Mueller, supra note 52, at 256-57 (presenting empirical data
indicating that most renters fail to read their lease terms because they find the language
confusing or fear an inability to understand legal jargon).
213 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 244 (noting that "competition [between form con-
tract terms] is likely to degrade the quality of preprinted terms" because the sellers in the
market will engage in a race to the bottom to make nonperformance terms harsher). It is
also likely that the rental market would lack efficiency in this type of competitive enviro-
ment because the "lack of information alters the assumption that free choice will inevitably
lead to an efficient result." Meyerson, supra note 207, at 603. Landlords prefer this market
inefficiency because they are able to draft and use forms that shift risks to the tenants. See
id. at 605.
214 See E-mail from Lawrence Shepard, Professor of Economics, University of Califor-
nia Davis, to author 3 (Oct. 20, 1997) (on file with author). Professor Shepard is an apart-
ment owner who rents to students in Davis, California. His comments regarding the state
of the rental market derive from his experiences as an apartment owner and from his
knowledge as a professor of economics.
215 For an articulation of this strategy, see Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 244. For exam-
ple, banks understand that consumers will focus on "performance terms" like'"interest
rates and activity charges"; therefore, they often include undesirable terms in their bank-
ing agreements that focus on "nonperformance terms ... such as terms detailing the con-
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pay attention to the security deposit amount but do not read the rest
of the lease. Knowing this trend, a landlord may decrease the amount
of the security deposit and include a provision that requires the ten-
ant to pay a fee for repairs. The landlord has an increased risk, on the
one hand, because the lower security deposit may not cover all dam-
ages to his property, but he has offset this risk by charging the tenants
for repairs. As soon as one landlord implements the repair charge,
others will follow suit by lowering the more visibile security deposit
and including the repair charge provision.2 16 Although the renters
might think that the high visibility term benefits them, this race to the
bottom actually results in less favorable form lease terms for the rent-
ers.2 1 7 This situation becomes even less favorable for renters when the
landlords start with a very high security deposit and subsequently re-
duce it, giving themselves a bargaining chip while still protecting their
property.
Furthermore, the landlord can affect the costs surrounding the
lease by adjusting both "performance" and "nonperformance"
terms.218 Performance terms are those on which a consumer will base
his decision, such as the security deposit in the above example, and
nonperformance terms are those that a consumer might consider in-
significant, such as the fee for repairs.219 For example, in the credit
card industry, annual fees and introductory interest rates are typically
performance terms, and late fees and long-term interest rates are typi-
cally nonperformance terms. Just as one deciding on a credit card
often will overlook nonperformance terms, a renter only focuses on
the performance terms and remains rationally ignorant about the re-
maining terms.220 Landlords catch the attention of tenants by making
performance terms more favorable while recapturing the resulting
cost by making nonperformance terms less favorable.
sequences of failing to detect and promptly report an error in the monthly statement, or
the penalty for overdrawing the account." Id Because consumers are not as interested in
these terms, the bank can save costs by using them, and the consumer usually will remain
rationally ignorant about them. See id.
216 See id. at 244 (positing that the players in a particular market will emulate each
other's performance and nonperformance contract terms).
217 Cf. id. (describing the same phenomenon in the banking industry, in which banks
offer low activity charges and high interest at the expense of other provisions).
218 Id. at 243-44 (suggesting that each form contract contains both types of terms).
219 See id. (describing and providing an example of how performance and nonper-
formance terms operate in a market).
220 Cf id. at 244 (describing that with banking terms, customers focus on those that are




b. Why Students Exemplify Rational Ignorance
Students tend to avoid investing the time and energy to make
informed housing decisions. 221 Students decide not to invest their
time or their energy in this decision because they often will stay in
their apartments only for a year,222 confining the ramifications of
their decisions to the short term. Students also choose ignorance be-
cause they do not consider what might go wrong.223 Therefore, they
believe that it is unlikely that nonperformance terms will affect
them. 224 In addition, students who do negotiate do so to change a
performance term, such as the lease length.225 Landlords often are
willing to alter performance terms such as lease length in exchange
for an increase in rent,226 which acts as the nonperformance term.
22 7
Therefore, to alter the performance term, students usually decide on
an apartment with rational ignorance about the nonperformance
term.
Because many students do not pay for their housing or education
costs themselves, they are not ultimately responsible for the financial
consequences of their decision. Thus, they are willing to forego an
informed rental decision. This dichotomy is perhaps the most unique
aspect of the college town environment. Unlike most rental situa-
tions, in college towns the student chooses the apartment, but often
either her parents or student loans pay the rent.228 This peculiar sce-
nario tends to result in increased prices in the local rental market.
229
As an additional consequence of this arrangement, renters often
will remain rationally ignorant about the performance terms of their
leases. To make an informed choice, one must use certain cognitive
221 Cf Grether et al., supra note 194, at 279 (describing consumers' tendencies to sacri-
fice making the best choice to reduce information processing costs).
222 See supra note 99.
223 See infra Part III.B.2.
224 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 243 (describing why people choose rational igno-
rance concerning nonperformance terms in form contracts).
225 See Mueller, supra note 52, at 265 n.70 (noting that students often negotiate for
shorter lease duration provisions because "many students desire an eight-month lease for
the academic year"). Moreover, because most college towns are not large cities, students
must leave for the summer to find work in either their hometown or a large city.
226 See id. at 265 ("Lease duration is the one term most conventionally surrendered by
landlords in return for an increase in rent; moreover, the length of the lease can be ad-
justed with less material sacrifice to the lessor .... " (footnote omitted)).
227 See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (maintaining that rent is not always a
student's primary consideration when leasing an apartment).
228 Obviously, this statement is a generalization. Not all students rely on their parents
or student loans. Certainly, some work to earn money to put themselves through school.
In most cases, however, students rely on their parents, on financial aid, or on a combina-
tion of the two to pay for school and related expenses, including rent.
229 See supra notes 97, 159 and accompanying text.
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skills.230 One must analyze the chances that an uncertain future event
will occur, accurately perceive the costs of that event, appreciate any
potential risks, and factor all of this information into a utility
calculus. 231 Again, the ticket buyer for a Cubs baseball game is analo-
gous. 23 2 When he decides whether to attempt to buy tickets for the
sold-out game from a seller on the street, he must measure the
chances that the game will be rained out, predict the cost of the tick-
ets, appreciate the risk of buying counterfeit tickets, and process these
factors in his utility calculus. Rational ignorance limits cognition, in-
terfering with this decision-making process.23 3 Moreover, in the Ith-
aca rental environment, students probably do not anticipate future
events, perceive the costs, or appreciate the risks of a poor bargain
because they are not responsible for its outcome.
2. Undue Optimism in Ithaca
Aside from making rationally ignorant decisions, students often
fail to anticipate potential problems with their apartments or land-
lords. Generally, young adults are unduly optimistic 23 4 about the
prospects of encountering apartment difficulties. In other words, they
are less likely to negotiate for favorable terms23 5 because they do not
foresee problems with either their landlord or their apartment.2 36 Ac-
230 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 213. Professor Eisenberg notes that to make deci-
sions in the face of uncertainty, people use their decision-making skills, which he calls
cognitive abilities. See id.
231 See id. For an extensive analysis of the psychology of decision making, focusing
especially on decision-making errors, see Ward Edwards & Detlofvon Winterfeldt, Cognitive
Illusions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 225 (1986).
232 See supra text accompanying notes 141-45.
233 See Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 213-16.
234 For a discussion of the meaning of undue optimism, see generally Colin F.
Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implica-
tions, 8 J. PoL'Y ANALYsis & MGMT. 565 (1989) (discussing how policy makers should react
when actors are unrealistic in their perceptions); Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 216-18
(describing the phenomenon in which people systematically make irrational decisions be-
cause they are unduly optimistic); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life
Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980) (discussing the phenomenon of un-
realistic optimism).
235 See Mueller, supra note 52, app. c at 288, 294 (questions 18, 19 & 30) (noting that
94% of the surveyed tenants had never attempted to bargain for lower rent, 93% had never
asked for a change in the prepayment of the first and last months' rent, and 82% had
never asked the landlord to make any changes in the terms of the lease (other than the
lease length and rent amount)). For an empirical explanation of why this situation is the
case, see supra note 177 and accompanying text.
236 Cf Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, Wien Every Relationship Is Above Average: Per-
ceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 442-43
(1993) (demonstrating that recently married couples are aware that 50% of marriages end
in divorce, but almost unanimously believe that theirs will succeed); Ola Svenson, Are We
All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 AcrA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146
(1981) (demonstrating that drivers optimistically believe that they are "safer and more
skillful" than other drivers). One commentator argues "that a tenant may, as a result of
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cordingly, young adults generally recognize the possibility of unpleas-
ant circumstances, but do not believe that they will fall victim to these
circumstances.
237
For example, Professors Lynn Baker and Robert Emery surveyed
newlyweds to discern their understanding of divorce law, their percep-
tions of the divorce rate in the general population, and their views
concerning the likelihood that their own marriages will end in di-
vorce.238 The median age of the male participants was twenty-seven,
and the median age of the female participants was twenty-five.
239
Overall, the participants optimistically predicted that their own mar-
riages would not end in divorce. 240 Moreover, the respondents "ex-
pressed unrealistically optimistic views about the likely consequences
should they personally be divorced, despite expressing unrealistically
pessimistic views that divorce statutes are biased against their own gen-
der."241 Baker and Emery concluded that young adults likely will not
investigate marriage law until a problem actually arises in their own
marriage because their "systematic optimism" leads them to "consider
divorce laws personally irrelevant."242 Similarly, students likely will
not investigate landlord-tenant law or even the provisions of their own
leases until they find themselves in a dispute. A study of students'
beliefs about their own driving abilities vividly illustrates how prone
students can be to undue optimism. 2 43 With a median age of twenty-
two, eighty-eight percent of the surveyed students viewed themselves
as better than average drivers.244
In general, "students tend to believe that they are more likely
than their peers to experience positive events and less likely to experi-
ence negative events."245 One significant factor that affects students'
reactions to various scenarios is their personal experience, or lack
prior experience or innate cynicism, expect that his lease will contain stringent terms to
which his attention was not drawn" by the landlord. Mueller, supra note 52, at 257 (empha-
sis added). Even if a tenant is cynical about the nature of his lease terms, Mueller's specu-
lation does not undermine the undue optimism argument. Although a tenant might be
critical of his landlord's behavior during the signing, he likely will remain unrealisticaly
optimistic about whether he will become embroiled in a landlord-tenant dispute. SeeWein-
stein, supra note 234, at 818 (maintaining that students often doubt that they will become
victims of any negative circumstances or occurrences).
237 See Baker & Emery, supra note 236, at 442-43.
238 See id. at 440-44.
239 See id. at 440 (indicating that the male ages ranged from 18 to 57 with a median age
of 27, and the female ages ranged from 15 to 38 with a median age of 25).
240 See id. at 443.
241 Id. at 447-48.
242 Id. at 448.
243 See Svenson, supra note 236, at 144-46.
244 See id, at 146.
245 Weinstein, supra note 234, at 818 (describing the results of his study, which ex-




thereof.2 46 Psychologists conducted studies on students and young
adults, asking them to predict their chances of experiencing certain
events247 in light of "any personal actions, plans, or attributes that
might affect their chances of experiencing the events."248 Taking
their personal experiences into account, the study found that students
exhibited unrealistic optimism.2 49 Because personal experience sig-
nificantly affects perception of risk, optimism likely will decline as one
grows older and gains more experience. 250 Students who rent apart-
ments during college likely do so for the first time. Therefore, they
do not have any experience dealing with the potential landlord-tenant
problems.251 Lack of experience and undue optimism make it very
unlikely that student renters will attempt to bargain for favorable
terms, allowing landlords to take advantage of them.
Regardless of the operation of the college town rental market,
students do not make housing decisions as informed, rational actors.
Instead, they act with rational ignorance because they are transient,
generally do not pay for their own living expenses, and act with deci-
sion-making skills inferior to those possessed by adult renters. More-
over, young adults likely will not bargain with their landlords to avert
risks because they are unduly optimistic about both the future in gen-
eral and the chances of a dispute arising from their particular lease.
These factors, along with the unique demographics of college towns,
underscore the special need for changes in the rental practices in col-
lege towns like Ithaca.
246 See Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 234, at 566 (articulating that "public percep-
tions are often unrealistic, in part because people lack direct experience with the risks");
Weinstein, supra note 234, at 813 (noting that the author correctly predicted that the cor-
relation between personal experience and level of optimism was "statistically significant").
But see Svenson, supra note 236, at 146-47 (arguing that even those who previously had
been at fault in car accidents believed that they were better than average drivers and not-
ing that "[t]his seems to indicate that we have difficulties in learning from experience").
247 The students responded to a questionnaire listing 18 positive events and 24 nega-
tive events. SeeWeinstein, supra note 234, at 810. Some examples of the positive events are
as follows: liking post-graduation job, owning a house, graduating in the top third of the
class, living past 80, and earning over $40,000 in 10 years. See id. Some examples of the
negative events are as follows: having a drinking problem, attempting suicide, suffering a
heart attack, getting lung cancer, being sued by someone, being the victim of a mugging,
and being sterile. See id.
248 Id. at 819.
249 See id. at 810.
250 Cf id (arguing that those "who believe, falsely, that their personal attributes ex-
empt them from risk or that their present actions reduce their risks below those of other
people may be inclined to engage in risky behaviors and to ignore precautions").
251 Most students do not have experience with making rental arrangements prior to
attending college. But see Mueller, supra note 52, at 257 (noting that student renters often





ADOPTION OF THE DAVIS MODEL LEASE AS A SOLUTION
This Note has articulated the difficulties that renters face in Ith-
aca. Other authors have cataloged the problems with owner-renter
relations and have recognized that "model" form leases can eliminate
some of the problems inherent in the traditional form lease.2 52 To
resolve the problems in Ithaca and other college towns, this Note pro-
poses the adoption of the Davis Model Lease ("DML") of the Univer-
sity of California Davis. This model lease strikes an adequate balance
between owner and renter rights, so that its adoption will help to alle-
viate college town rental problems.
A. Ithaca Should Adopt the Davis Model Lease in a
Cooperative Fashion
If Ithaca does decide to adopt the DML, it must determine how to
effect that adoption. Fortunately, Ithaca can look for guidance to Da-
vis, California, which enacted the DML. According to Fred R. Cos-
tello, Associate Director of Student Housing and Child Care at the
University of California Davis, the DML emerged from the difficulties
surrounding the city in the late 1960s.2 53 Davis faced massive rent
strikes and landlord-tenant disputes during this time, prompting law
students from the University to work with Costello's office and local
landlords to draft what later became the DML.254 Although Ithaca
likely does not face the risk of rent strikes, similarities between it and
Davis make Ithaca ripe for the adoption of the DML.
Davis, like Ithaca, has a relatively small population.255 Moreover,
universities stand at the core of each community and represent the
dominant employer in each area.25 6 The demographic characteristics
of Davis also resemble those of Ithaca-the dominant age group spans
252 See, e.g., Bentley, supra note 41, at 857 & n.125 (explaining that the Bar Association
form lease omits the jury waiver provision, indicating that "the draftsmen of the Bar Associ-
ation lease did recognize the shortcomings of the traditional form lease and consciously
sought to break from it").
253 See Telephone Interview with Fred R. Costello, Associate Director of Student Hous-
ing and Child Care, University of California Davis (Apr. 30, 1998) (notes on file with au-
thor). This Note relies heavily on interviews with and letters from Costello to describe
both the adoption and the solvency of the DML in Davis, California. Unfortunately, scant
material recounting the events that have occurred in the Davis rental market during the
years since its adoption has been published.
254 See id. For a general discussion of rent strikes, see GOODMAN, supra note 17, at 159-
69. Essentially, a rent strike "is the organized withholding of rent by the tenants of a build-
ing from the owner of the building." Id. at 159.
255 Compare Zip Rezide: 95616 (Davis), Claritas, Aug. 19, 1997, available in LEXIS, Ge-
odem Library, Ziprez File (noting that Davis has a population of 51,337), with Zip Rezide:
14850 (Ithaca), supra note 78 (noting that Ithaca has a population of 57,617).
256 See Telephone Interview with Fred R. Costello, supra note 253.
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from eighteen to twenty-four.257 One accurately could describe either
city as having "an unusual concentration of unmarried persons 18-24
years old [who are] primarily students or young people just entering
the labor force."2 58 Moreover, a majority of the students and employ-
ees of the university in Davis live near the school and rent their hous-
ing.2 59 Similarly, because of Ithaca's relative isolation, most people
with a connection to either Cornell or Ithaca College live in the imme-
diate area.2 60 Finally, the majority of renters in each locale have occu-
pied their units for fewer than five years.
26'
Following the lead of Davis, the Common Counsel of Ithaca
should not impose the DML on the market. Indeed, the political in-
fluence of property owners might alter it, creating a lease that is as
inequitable as the form leases they currently use.262 Rather, Cornell
University and Ithaca College should coordinate with student
groups263 and local landlords to adopt the lease.2 6 Once they follow
the DML format to draft the initial lease, the document continuously
257 Compare Zip Rezide: 95616 (Davis), supra note 255 (reporting that 29.27% of the
population is between the ages of 18 and 24 with a median age of 27.4 years), with Zip
Rezide: 14850 (Ithaca), supra note 78 (reporting that 28.08% of the population is between
the ages of 18 and 24 with a median age of 28.4 years).
258 Zip Rezide: 95616 (Davis), supra note 255; see also supra text accompanying notes 81-
82 (discussing the high population of college students in Ithaca).
259 See Zip Rezide: 95616 (Davis), supra note 255 (reporting that 59.44% of the Davis
population rents its housing).
260 See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
261 Compare Zip Rezide: 95616 (Davis), supra note 255 (reporting that 73.32% of the
renting population has moved into their present units within the last five years), with Zip
Reide: 14850 (Ithaca), supra note 78 (reporting that 64.31% of the renting population has
moved into their present units within the last five years).
262 See Bentley, supra note 41, at 880 ("[S] hifting the controversy over lease terms from
the renting agent's office to the legislature might result in a statutory lease as inequitable
and unworkable as any of the traditional forms. Tenants assumedly outnumber landlords
in New York State, yet the interests of property owners are not neglected in Albany.").
263 Students probably can organize better than most other groups of tenants. See E-
mail from Lawrence Shepard, Professor of Economics, University of California Davis, to
author 1 (Nov. 18, 1997) (on file with author) (observing that students often are able to
organize successfully into groups and effect changes in the college environment); see also
Barbara Brody et al., Students Block Traffic, Protest Housing Repor, CoRNELL DAILY SUN, May
3, 1996, at 1 (reporting that "to postpone the trustee vote on [a] program house proposal
... about 200 students obstructed crosswalks at major campus intersections").
264 Davis adopted the DML in a similar fashion. See Letter from Fred R Costello, Com-
munity Housing Coordinator, University of California Davis, to Davis Community Re-
sources 1 (May 20, 1977) (on file with author) (recounting that the DML, "which has been
used extensively throughout Davis since 1969, reflects the combined efforts of many indi-
viduals, including members of [the university housing office] staff, property owners and
managers, as well as student and non-student residents").
In fact, it would not hurt Cornell University to adopt the DML itself. The University
'reserves the right to reassign students to any room the University chooses," even though
the students sign housing contracts "for specific rooms." Brendan Sobie, 'Small Print'
Abounds in Housing Contracts, CoRNELL DAILY SUN, Oct. 15, 1993, at 1. Students also charge
that this very provision is in fine print. See id. ("'It is in the small print that [the contract]
isn't binding,' [one student] said." (first alteration in original)).
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should evolve as various groups offer improvements.2 65 Thus, partici-
pants in Ithaca's housing market can tailor Ithaca's version of the
DMIL to accommodate the unique rental issues of the city.
Both Cornell and Ithaca College then should send copies of Ith-
aca's DML to all enrolled students during the summer and suggest
that they rent only from owners who use it. This measure will increase
the likelihood of its use because owners who fail to use it may lose
tenants. Advocates of the DML's adoption could seek widespread
owner use, thereby enabling it to alleviate rental problems in Ithaca.
B. Adoption of the Davis Model Lease Will Help Alleviate
Ithaca's Rental Problems
1. The Davis Model Lease Departs from Traditional Form Leases
The DML is quite straightforward. Unlike the typical form lease,
which is disorganized and riddled with fine print,266 the DML is
reader-friendly. It provides seven initial provisions-"A" through
"G"-and thirty-two additional terms.267 The lease uses the terms
"owner" and "resident," presenting them always in uppercase let-
ters.268 The initial sections list the parties' names and addresses, the
term of the lease, the rent in both total and monthly amounts, the
address to which the resident must send the rent, and the total sum
due at the commencement of the lease.2 69 The initial provisions also
include a section specifying the procedures for the payment and re-
turn of the resident's security deposit and a section governing
utilities.270
The drafters of the DML's provisions aimed for straightforward-
ness and clarity. While the DML resembles most form leases in that it
looks like a legal document, its terminology is simple and it defines its
terms internally. For example, the provision detailing security depos-
its instructs that the owner is entitled to retain a portion of the secur-
ity deposit for any damage, unless it results from "reasonable use and
265 Davis has revised the DML six times. See Letter from Fred R. Costello, Manager of
Community and Student Family Housing and Child Care Services, University of California
Davis, to Davis Area Apartment Owner 1 (Oct. 22, 1987) (on file with author) (noting that
the DML has "undergone six revisions" and that "[i]n each instance, a concerted effort has
been made to balance the interests of both landlords and tenants and to develop a docu-
ment acceptable to all parties").
266 See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
267 See DAvIs MODEL LEASE, supra note 12.
268 See id. The use of these terms alone is a marked departure from the typical "land-
lord" and "tenant," which arose in feudal times when the tenant was subservient both in
rights and in stature to the lord of the land. See Letter from Fred R. Costello to Davis
Community Resources, supra note 264, at 1 (noting that the terms landlord and tenant
"date[ ] back to feudal times"); supra Part I.
269 See DAVIs MODEL LEASE, supra note 12, §§ A-C, E.
270 See id. §§ D, F.
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wear," which it explains "may be understood to mean the gradual de-
terioration resulting from use, lapse of time, and the operation of the
elements, in spite of RESIDENT's care."27' By providing a definition
of "reasonable use and wear," the DML forewarns both parties about
what kind of damage applies against the security deposit. It also estab-
lishes the initial condition of the apartment by requiring the comple-
tion and signing of an inventory within three days of the move-in date,
and it reminds both parties to complete and sign the statement
promptly "in order to minimize disputes over the return of the secur-
ity deposit."272 Another example of the DML's internal definition
structure concerns the first provision, which both defines joint and
several liability and instructs the resident to choose her housemates
carefully.273 This clarity distinguishes the DML from other linguisti-
cally confusing form leases.274
In contrast to the typical form lease, the DML contains neither
unenforceable provisions that seek to confuse residents nor hidden
provisions that provide leverage to the owner.2 75 First, the lease
adopts the English Rule,2 7 6 under which the owner must deliver actual
possession of the premises within three working days of "the com-
mencement of [the] lease."2 77 If a delay occurs, regardless of whether
it is the owner's fault, the resident may terminate the lease or demand
that the owner provide comparable accommodations in exchange for
the tenant's payment of rent 2 78 Second, the DML does not include
the demand for jury waiver or the infamous agreement not to coun-
terclaim.27 9 Third, although the resident must obtain the owner's
271 Id. § D.
272 Id. § 5 ("Both OWNER and RESIDENT are reminded of the importance of the
prompt signing of this inventory statement, in order to minimize disputes over the return
of the security deposit.").
273 See id. § 1. The language of that section reads as follows:
The language "joint and several" means that if more than one person has
signed this lease as a RESIDENT, then each of the RESIDENTS and the
RESIDENTS collectively are fully responsible for fulfiling (including full
payment of rent) all of the conditions of this lease, except where expressly
otherwise agreed. Thus, it is the RESIDENTS' duty to select as their CO-
RESIDENTS persons who will fulfill their respective "share" of the obliga-
tions contracted for under this lease.
Id.
274 See supra Part I.B.
275 See supra notes 41-46 and accompanying text.
276 See supra note 25 (distinguishing the English Rule for delivery of possession from
the American Rule).
277 DAvis MODEL LEASE, supra note 12, § 3.
278 See id. § 4.
279 In addition to waiving the right to a jury, form leases often strip tenants of their
legal right to counterclaim, typically with the following language: "It is further agreed that
if the Landlord commences any summary proceeding, the Tenant will not interpose any
counterclaim of whatever nature or description in any such proceeding except as permit-
ted by statute." BERGER, supra note 46, § 5.1, at 241 (quoting a standard form lease).
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consent for a sublease or assignment, 280 the lease explicitly provides
that the "OWNER may not unreasonably withhold consent to such a
sublease or assignment."281 Fourth, if the owner sells the property,
the lease protects the resident by freeing the original owner from his
obligations only if the new owner "fulfill [s] the terms, covenants, and
conditions of this lease." 28 2 Fifth, the owner can enter the premises
only upon "24 hours written notice," save in cases of emergency.283
Finally, the owner remains liable for all injuries that take place on the
premises that are not the fault of the resident.284 Similarly, the resi-
dent bears no liability for any injury that arises from the owner's
fault.28 5 Each of these provisions protects the resident from the prac-
tices of unscrupulous owners.
The DML also attempts to equalize lease terms. It does not leave
the resident to search through legal books and their supplements to
discover the enforceability of a term.286 For example, the DML speci-
fies that " [i] n the event of any legal action concerning this lease, the
losing party shall pay to the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees
and court costs." 28 7 Although this provision still places the resident in
the risky position of gambling to prevail in a lawsuit, it at least com-
ports with the law.288 For example, section 234 of New York's Real
Property Law provides that when a lease contains a provision requir-
ing the resident to pay legal fees if he has breached, the lease also
must require the owner to pay the fees if he has breached. 289 While
most form leases prescribe a waiver of this section-even though such
a waiver "shall be void as against public policy"29 0 -the DML recog-
nizes the requirements of this type of law and embraces them.
The DML contains a provision for mediation 291 that, with slight
modification, will increase the ability of the parties to resolve conflicts
without resorting to the courts, thereby improving the renter's success
280 State law inconsistently addresses whether one may enforce "silent consent clauses"
that do not mention any reasonableness requirement. See Martha Wach, Note, Withholding
Consent To Alienate: If Your Landlord Is in a Bad Mood, Can He Prevent You from Alienating Your
Lease?, 43 DuKE LJ. 671, 672 (1993) ("The [silent consent clause] issue has been litigated
in most of the states over several decades, leaving an unsettled area of law." (footnote
omitted)).
281 DAvis MODEL LEAsE, supra note 12, § 13(c).
282 Id. § 24.
283 Id. § 10.
284 See id. § 22.
285 See id.
286 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
287 DAvis MODEL LEASE, supra note 12, § 27 (emphasis added).
288 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 234 (McKinney 1989).
289 See id.
290 Id.
291 See DAVIS MODEL LEASE, supra note 12, § 16. This is not the first proposal for media-
tion in landlord-tenant disputes. See David M. Ebel, Landlord-Tenant Mediation Project in
Colorado, 17 URB. L. ANN. 279 (1979) (describing the landlord-tenant mediation project
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in dispute resolution.292 Section 16 allows the parties to submit any
dispute to mediation, but does not require that the parties resolve
their disputes through that method.293 Unfortunately, the DML fails
to define mediation, leaving a resident wondering what to do in a dis-
pute.294 It is important to inform the parties about what mediation
entails and where they can locate mediation services. The lease
should state clearly where and at what phone number the parties can
find a mediation service. For example, the New York State Legislature
has established Community Dispute Resolution Centers2 95 to provide
this voluntary service to disputing parties, but many people remain
unaware of this possible solution.29 6 If the disputing parties learn of
the location and function of a mediator, they will enhance their ability
to resolve their dispute without resorting to legal action.
The DML has additional shortcomings as well. As with the media-
tion clause, however, slight modifications in the lease can overcome
them. Several provisions create overarching bans on various activities.
For instance, without the owner's written consent, the tenant cannot
accommodate an overnight guest for "more than three (3) nights dur-
ing any consecutive fifteen (15) day period,"297 nor can the tenant
keep pets. 2 9 8 These provisions create problems because they do not
define the penalties for breaches, enabling the owner both to argue
that the resident breached a "substantial obligation" and then to ter-
minate the lease.299 A better provision would give the owner the au-
thority to terminate the lease if the resident violates a certain standard
started in Colorado in the hope of alleviating the burden on the court system and of fairly
solving landlord-tenant disputes).
292 See Joel Kurtzberg & Jamie Henikoff, Freeing the Parties from the Law: Designing an
Interest and Rights Focused Model of Landlord/Tenant Mediation, 1997 J. Disp. RESOL. 53, 107
(asserting "that tenants as a whole are better off mediating than they are either negotiating
without a third-party neutral or going before a judge").
293 See DAvis MODEL LEASE, supra note 12, § 16. This provision reads as follows:
In the event that OWNER and RESIDENT are unable to resolve any dispute
or claim arising out of this rental agreement, either party may submit the
dispute to any or all established methods of mediation, such as those of-
fered by the Davis Community Mediation Service, This provision shall not
be construed or interpreted to constitute an arbitration clause requiring
arbitration, nor as the sole or exclusive remedy to both parties.
Id.
294 See ZevJ. Eigen, Voluntary Mediation in New York State, Disp. REsOL.J., Summer 1997,
at 58, 59 (pointing out that most laypeople do not know what Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion and mediation are or how they work outside of "business or employment-related"
settings).
295 See N.Y. JUD. LAw §§ 849-a to -g (McKinney 1992).
296 See Eigen, supra note 294, at 59.
297 DAVIS MODEL LEASE, supra note 12, § 21.
298 See id. § 23.
299 See L.H. Estates Co. v. Bartholomew, 163 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (App. Term 1957)
(holding that the installation of a washing machine by the tenant constituted a breach
sufficiently substantial to warrant eviction).
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of behavior.300 Moreover, the provision for security deposits allows
the parties to fill in the amount.30' A better provision would fix the
amount at "one month's rent" to keep unscrupulous owners from
gouging residents or from using security deposits to entice residents
into a bad bargain.302 These improvements would increase the DML's
effectiveness for protecting the rights of residents.
2. The Davis Model Lease Addresses Ithaca's Rental Problems
The DML will help alleviate the concerns that this Note has enu-
merated.30 3 First, the DML provides a better alternative to the form
leases that Ithaca owners currently use. In Davis, the use of the lease
grew rather quickly because large owners became involved early and
others followed.304 According to Costello, eighty-five percent of the
owners in Davis used the DML in 1993.305 The DML uses the terms
"resident" and "owner," removing the stigma that is "traditionally asso-
ciated with the landlord-tenant relationship."30 6 In addition, its archi-
tects designed the provisions of the DML to prevent problems that
might arise-"the required beginning inventory, end-of-term inspec-
tion, and mediation service are oriented toward crisis prevention and
problem solving."30 7 The DML also gives owners the power to collect
a fee for late rent and to deduct from security deposits for cosmetic
repairs such as "painting, carpet cleaning, laundering of drapes, etc.
when necessitated by the tenants' failure to take proper care of the
premises."308 Costello has described the general success of the DML:
300 See Bentley, supra note 41, at 866. The lease that Bentley's article proposed had a
similar provision:
"Tenant covenants that he shall not commit or permit a nuisance in
the premises, that he shall not maliciously or by reason of gross negligence
substantially damage the premises, and that he shall not engage in conduct
such as to interfere substantially with the comfort and safety of Landlord or
of other tenants or occupants of the same or another adjacent building or
structure."
Id. (quoting the South Brooklyn Legal Services lease).
301 See DAvIs MODEL LEASE, supra note 12, § D.
302 See supra text accompanying notes 214-16.
303 The DML has benefited both Davis and other college communities that have
adopted it. See Letter from Fred R. Costello, Off-Campus Housing Coordinator, University
of California Davis, to Hank Fisher et al., Board of Directors, DAOMA 1-2 (June 14, 1974)
(on file with author) (describing the success of the DML in Davis and of similar leases in
other college towns).
304 See Telephone Interview with Fred R. Costello, supra note 253.
305 See id.; see also Letter from Fred R Costello to Davis Area Apartment Owner, supra
note 265, at 1 ("Historically, [the DML has] enjoyed broad-based community support from
property owners and managers, residents, tenant advocacy organizations, City Counsel
members, and the Davis Police Department.").
306 Letter from Fred R. Costello to Davis Community Resources, supra note 264, at 1;
see supra note 268.
307 Letter from Fred R. Costello to Davis Area Apartment Owner, supra note 265, at 1.
308 Letter from Fred R. Costello to Hank Fisher et al., supra note 303, at 2.
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Apart from its credibility as a legal document, which has served this
community well since 1969, the Model Lease has become a symbol
of cooperation, trust, and equitable leasing practices which stands
without parallel. It has become the model for similar efforts in
other college communities throughout the country and the focal
point of our amicable relationship in the past.
30 9
The widespread adoption of the DML also will bring uniformity to
dispute resolution, helping both the building department and the
courts deal with owner-resident disputes.3 1 0 On the whole, the DML's
designers and keepers have fashioned it to address the unique issues
facing college towns such as Ithaca.
Second, the DML will address Ithaca's problems by tempering
the effects of monopolistic competition on the market. Within the
system of monopolistic competition, in which owners attempt to dis-
tinguish their property,3 1 ' the DML removes the lease as a bargaining
tool, forcing owners to compete with each other through lower rental
prices, better maintenance, and more lavish space.31 2 It will change
the dynamic of the rental market by giving residents a fair lease and by
facilitating an amicable, cooperative, and trustful relationship with the
owners, creating adequate leverage for residents to negotiate reason-
able rent3 1 3 In other words, if the owner and the renter actually bar-
gain over the price of the apartment, each likely will act more fairly
during the negotiation if their relationship is amicable and trustful.
3 14
309 1&
310 See Letter from Fred R. Costello to Davis Area Apartment Owner, supra note 265, at
1 ("Local attorneys and judges are familiar with these documents. Consequently, it
reduces ambiguity regarding interpretation of rights and responsibilities."); see also Inter-
view with Kathleen Decker, supra note 9 (explaining that the use of a uniform lease would
substantially bolster her ability to deal with renter complaints).
311 See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
312 Cf Eisenberg, supra note 189, at 244 (articulating that to compete with each other,
banks will use the terms of the contract on which people focus to attract customers with
visible incentives and then take advantage of them with hidden costs). If the owners can-
not use the terms of the lease to compete with each other or to distinguish themselves, they
will have to turn to more substantive means of competition such as lower rent or higher
quality apartments.
313 See Letter from Fred R. Costello to Hank Fisher et al., supra note 303, at 2 (arguing
that the DML has become a "symbol" of cooperation and trust and has created an "amica-
ble relationship" in Davis between the owners and the renters); cf. GooDsMAN, supra note
17, at 4, 18 (urging that tenants change their attitudes about the hopelessness of their
situation, which will empower them to organize and protect their rights). The DML will
help renters not to see themselves as powerless, which will give them the courage to bar-
gain for fair rent.
314 Cf Geoffirey M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 OHIo ST. LJ. 1, 40 (1987)
(emphasizing that "there are occasions where parties to a negotiation bristling with hard-
bargaining opportunities reach agreement without using deception"). The most likely
place to find this type of nondeceptive bargaining is in those negotiations "among people
who have special reasons to care about each other's welfare-families and friends." Id.
Although it is possible that one would negotiate without deception only because of a long-
standing relationship, in which one party concedes in the short term in order to gain
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If the parties decide to bargain for the open terms under the DML,
this atmosphere of trust will "lower[ ] the transaction costs" by elimi-
nating mutual suspicion.31 5 In addition, an amicable relationship will
result in better performance of lease terms by each party. Owners
would be less concerned that tenants will damage their apartments,316
leading owners to reduce rent. Furthermore, by defining the term
"reasonable use and wear"317 and requiring owners to "supply resi-
dents with a policy statement explaining their interpretation of 'rea-
sonable use and wear' as it applies to their rental property,"318 the
DML will reduce ambiguity concerning what repairs the owner can
apply against the security deposit. Finally, by way of comparison, the
ratio between the average rental rate and the average home value is
benefits in the long term, Professor Peters believes that a party might negotiate this way for
different reasons. See id. at 41. For example, a husband might choose to go to a certain
restaurant that his wife likes, even though he does not want to go there, because his "wife's
happiness is immediately valuable to [him]." Id. Professor Peters recognizes that this type
of bargaining probably will vary "depend[ing] on the relationship of the parties," but he
concedes that "there is no reason to think that altruism cannot be found in dealings be-
tween total strangers." Id While the owner-renter relationship obviously is not as close as
the familial relationship, how one bargains appears to depend in part upon his feelings
toward the other party at the onset of the negotiations. See, e.g., CarltonJ. Snow, Building
Trust in the Workplace, 14 HoTsrRA LAB. LJ. 465, 485-91 (1997) (arguing that parties can
arrive at better collective bargaining agreements if they enter negotiations trusting each
other).
315 G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts:
Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REv. 221, 255-56 (1991) ("The cost savings that
trust can yield are too great to ignore when evaluating potential contracting partners dur-
ing the negotiation process. It becomes vitally important, therefore, for parties to signal
their willingness and ability to foster trust." (footnote omitted)); cf. Snow, supra note 314,
at 485 (noting that in the context of collective bargaining " [a] practical incentive for labor-
management parties to develop a relationship of trust is that it makes more sense economi-
cally than distrust").
316 Cf Snow, supra note 314, at 493-94 ("A relationship of trust encourages parties to
be creative in drafting and administering an agreement and encourages workers to per-
form their duties as effectively as possible. Where there is trust, workers are more inclined
to seek the most productive way of doing ajob." (footnote omitted)). Indeed, Professor
Snow reports "that a relationship of trust within the workplace contributes to the success of
the business. There is better health, less absenteeism and a more spirited commitment to
the mission of the enterprise." Id. at 487 (footnote omitted). Although the analogy be-
tween the owner-renter and employer-employee relationships is not perfect, Professor
Snow's observations support the general notion that people who trust one another are
more likely to cooperate than those who do not.
317 See supra notes 271-72 and accompanying text; see also Letter from Fred R. Costello
to Davis Community Resources, supra note 264, at 2 (stating that "owners will be required
to supply residents with a policy statement explaining their interpretation of 'reasonable
use and wear'").
318 Letter from Fred R. Costello to Davis Community Resources, supra note 264, at 2.
In addition, the owner must supply "a statement indicating whether or not carpets have
been cleaned, drapes laundered, and walls painted in preparation for resident occupancy,"
which will help foster the atmosphere of trust. Id.
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lower in Davis than in Ithaca, demonstrating the influence of the
DML on the market.319
Third, the DML will impact the Ithaca market by solving the
problems of rational ignorance and undue optimism. Rationally igno-
rant decision making allows landlords to use form leases with profita-
ble nonperformance lease terms, allowing them to compete on
performance lease terms without fear of reprisal.3 20 If all owners use
the DML, they could not gouge the resident with nonperformance
terms because they would use the same prewritten lease, which does
not contain hidden nonperformance clauses. In addition, a renter's
undue optimism will not undermine his success in potential conflicts
because the DML's provisions provide adequate warning to the renter
of his obligations, thereby allowing the renter to negotiate realisti-
cally. Kathleen Decker, Rental Housing Specialist for the Ithaca
Building Department, confronts landlord-tenant disputes daily and is
confident that this lease would solve many of the problems facing col-
lege towns by bringing fairness and uniformity to the rental market.3 21
CONCLUSION
Ithaca faces a perpetual and escalating crisis in its rental market.
A limited supply of decent apartments impacts both the student and
nonstudent populations by inflating rents and by forcing renters to
live in substandard apartments. Moreover, the use of standard form
leases containing unenforceable provisions exacerbates the inequality
in bargaining power, especially given the rational ignorance and un-
due optimism of the renting population. A legitimate solution to
these problems is the adoption of the DML, which augments the
rights and remedies available to residents, eliminates inequitable bar-
gaining, and improves the economics of the market. If Ithaca land-
lords began using the DML, the words "sign here" finally would
become a welcome invitation to an amicable leasehold.
319 Compare Zip Rezide: 95616 (Davis), supra note 255 (reporting that in Davis the me-
dian gross monthly rent is $573 and that the median home value is $230,854), with Zip
Rezide: 14850 (Ithaca), supra note 78 (reporting that in Ithaca the median gross monthly
rent is $508 and that the median home value is $137,824). It may appear that the median
rental value in Ithaca is less than that in Davis, but that is not the case. By using the
median home value as a determinator for real estate costs, one can calculate the premium
one must pay in Davis to buy the same type of house they could buy in Ithaca. In Davis, the
median home value is 67.5% higher than it is in Ithaca, most likely due to the marked
difference in weather patterns between the two college towns. Thus, a house that would
cost $100,000 in Ithaca would cost $167,500 in Davis. One would expect the difference in
median rental value to be similar, but it is not. Davis only has a 12.8% premium on rental
property. This discrepancy either means that Ithaca's rental rates are too high or that
Davis's are too low. Either way, a disparity exists.
320 See supra note 215-17 and accompanying text.
321 See Interview with Kathleen Decker, supra note 9.
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Reproductions may be altered.
Sign original leases ONLY
DAVIS MODEL LEASE
THIS IS A LEASE FOR THE RENTAL OF REAL PROPERTY IN CONSIDERATION FOR A SUM OF MONEY ACCORDING TO THE
TERMS SPECIFIED BELOW.
In conside0ion of the rents reserved below, the OWNER does hereby lease, demise. and let unto the RESIDENT the premisas
described below. Both the OWNER and the RESIDENT agree to keep. perform. and UM the covenants. consion. and agreements
expressed below.
The OWNER of the eased Promised (or the person authorized to ad for and an behalf of the OWNER) for the purpose of service of
process and for the pupose of receving and recelpting a notices and demands ts:
Name and Address Phone
The person authorized to manage the premises ts,
Name andAddress Phone -
The RESIDENTS are:
Print Name Permanent Home Address Home Phone
A. ADDRESS:The location othe promises Is:
- Davis. Calfornia. 95616. Unit No. __
B. TERM: The trm of this lease Is beginnin.g _ .g 1 .
Ifand tmnatin____ 19
- C. RENT: The total rental prce for the term of the lease is $. payable In mnthly of $ _ due in
advance on the - day of each month. The rent shalt be considered ile on the __ day of each month.
Therent Is to be paldto ae foo .
The QWNER shelf have the right to assess a service charge (not to exceed S30.00) at the rate of $10.00 for each r veday perod.
beginnirng onthe 5t day aftertha due day. I" which the rent rem"ns unpaiaterhe due da, s a bei
- by the ad idonal adsrnlstra ive costs inolved. Late fees may be avoided by Inforuing the OWNER on or before the diue dte and
mutualty arranging for an alternative payment data.
I . SECURITY DEPOSIT. RESIDENTle requred to deposi;t wth OWNER the n of S - as a securty deposit. OWNER
may deduct from the security deposit such amounts necessary tocover any defaults in the fIitul poomnce bythe RESIDENT of thetemns. covenants, and conr4ine o the agroment. The coat of maein nance and repair$a (r painting, clening of carpets, and
lsaundering of drapes). when due to reasonable use and wear. shall be massmed by the OWNER. It Isthe duty of the RESIDENTto ratuan
't prnr lea o their condin At e Commencement O ft lease, reasonable use and wear O edo excepted. Reasonable ue and wearJmy be understood to means the gradual deterioration resulting fromt use, lapseof tilne. and the operation of the elements, ins Spite Of
RESIDENI. care.
(1)Aftached hereto and Incorporated herein by reference Is a pokiy statement otlining those Keot to be cleaned and property
mantained in order for the RESIDENT to receive a full relond of the security deposit. OWNER will obtain at least one RESIDEN'si. agnatureonthisstatementbefore the lease Is gned.A thetkne ofooupancyOWNERsh furtherprovde RESIDENTw a statement
outlinin whiether or trot carpets have been shampooed, drapes have been laurndered. and walls have been painted i preparation for
RESIDENT occupancy.
(2)tn the absence of any matertal breach of this lease by RESIDENT RESIDENT will receive Interest In the security deposit in the
amount of five (5) percent per anrun for the term of the lease. which ha be added to any ratonded portion of the sectly deposit.
E. TOTAL SUM DUE PRIOR TO OR ON COMMENCEMENT OF LEASE,
First Month's Rent S Last Month's Rent $
Security Deposit S____________ Total S$ ____________
Other Deposit (Spectly) $
By optional and mutual agreement between OWNER and RESIDENT. RESIDENT agrees to pay the
(S ) In Installments according to the folowing schedule:
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F. UTILITIES: Charge for utitles connected with the premles shall be paid by OWNER with the exception of
which *hal be paid by RESIDENT.
G. MISCELLANEOUS. (1) This $ease Incorporates and Is subject o Paragraphs I through 32 attached hereto. which are hereby referred
to and Incorporated as If set out here at length. (2) This lease constitutes the sole agreement between the parties, and no additions,
deletions, or modlflcations may be accomptlahed without the written consent of both parties, except as provided In Paragraph D
above, and in Paragraph 17.'Rulea and Regulalnrs.= Any oral rapresentaliona made at the tkne of executfi t lesse are not legally
valid and therefore are not binding on eitherparly. (3) The wordsOWNER! and 'RESIDENT' as used herein Include the plural as ell as
the singular. (4) 11 RESIDENTS are minor$. then their parents or legal guardians guarantee and agree to perform an of the terms.
covenants, and conditions of this lease by aflfiing their signatures below. (5) RESIDENTS hereby designate
as the RESIDENT to receive notice and hereby state that service of notice on such person shall be deemed to be service on all
RESIDENTS. (6) Designated RESIDENT hereby acknowledges receipt of an executed copy of this lease, and the RESIDENTS. If more
than one. agree that they will be jointly and severally bound thereby.
The parties hereby bind themselves to this lease by their signatures affixed below on this day




(all blanica should be filed In or lined out)
ADDITIONAL TERMS OF LEASE
1. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY DEFINED. The RESI- indeliveryof the premises.
DENTS are jointly and severally liable. The language 'Joint and Any election by the RESIDENTS to void this lease must be
several' means that it more than one person has signed this madeprIortopossessoion. insuch event.OWNER shallhave the
lease as a RESIDENT, then each of the RESIDENTS and the right to cuuge RESIDENTS a prorated amount of rent for tern-
RESIDENTS collectively are fully responsible for fullling (in- poreryaccommodalions, receivedby RESIDENTS at OWNERS
lding full payment of rent) all of the conditions of this lease. expense.
except where expressly otherwise agreed. Thus. It Is the RESI- 4. FAILURETO DELIVER PREMISES. In the eventof OWNER'S
DENTS' duty to select as their CO-RESIDENTS persons who inabiTy to deliver the premises under the terms of the lease,
will fulfill their respective 'share of the obligations contracted for OWNER may. at RESIDENT'S option, provide RESIDENTS with
under this lease. comparable or better accommodations at an equivaient rental
2. BREACH PRIOR TO LEASE COMMENCEMENT. Once this rate. Otherwise OWNER shall void the lease and refund all
lease has been executed, i at any time prior to the commence- money previously paid by RESIDENTS, plus actual damages
merit date set forth In this lease, any RESIDENT gives written nottoexceedanamount greater thanthe sum of two (2) months'
notice that elba intends not to perform the terms of this lease, rent. ,
OWNER may then elect to. 6. BEGINNING INVENTORY. At the time RESIDENT takes pes-
(0i terminate this lease and hold all of the RESIDENTS liable session of the premses. OWNER shall provide RESIDENT with
for actual &=as Inx'd by the b OWNER must at- an Inventory statement. RESIDENT sha Indiate on the state-tempt to millgate damage bynmaking resonable efforts to inet01 mert the condition of the promises and their furnishings and
the premises and reduce damages. In any event said damages decoratons. Both OWNER and RESIDENT s sign and re-
shall not exceed an amount greater than the sam of two (2) celve an executed copy of the inventory statement within three
monthar nt (3) days of the date of feling possession. When RESIDENTS
ll not terminate thi lease and hold remakn RESIDENTS retn po son of the prmises to OWNER, they shall return
joitly and severally able for all the ternn of this lease. t n h d o th iVe same
(-) not tertinate this lease and ol those RESIDENTS not condition as when recev, reasonable ue and wear thereof
giving seld notice liable for the rent stated herein. reduced excepted. Both OWNER and RESIDENT am reminded of the
pe Ipoteetaeybyanamountequaltothdefa iREStDEN'S inportnce of the prompt signing of this Inventory statement in
hare of the rent remaining to be paid. order to mininmiz disputes over the return of the security de-
3. DELAYED OCCUPANCY. If OWNER cannot delivr posses- posit.
sion within a grace period of three (3) working days from 
the  
6. END OF TERM INSPECTION. (a) When possession of the
commencement of this lease. RESIDENTS may declare this premiseesreturnedtoOWNER.OWNERand RESIDENTsha"
les ntA and vok, and all money previously paid shall be conduct a joh Inspection of the premises and the furnishings
refuxed to RESIDENTS. If the delay Is due to constnuction or and deortion.
repair work. the grace period hall be extended an additional (b) RESIDENT must within one (1) week pror tovcating the
three (3) working days. During the grace period OWNER must. premise, arrange man y conve"nt tme dudrng OWNERS
at RESIDENT'S optio and afterthe grace period OWNER may. normal business hours for the inspection; fallur to do so or to
at RESIDENT'S opto, provide the prospective RESIDENTS atendatthearrangedtnewillrelieveOWNERofanyobligation
with reasonable temporary accommodatons. RESIDENTS shal to make an Inspection i RESIDENT'S presence.
remain responslble for payment of rent unless they elect not to (c) OWNER may use the Davs Mode/ln ntory and Inspec-
accept termporary accommodations. In such event the rent ov- tlon Form or reasonable facsknile for the purposes of this In-
erng the period between commencement of the ease and specion. On the form. both OWNER and RESIDENT must
possession of the preries shal be deducted from the iext rent describe what they believe to be the damage and harm caused
payment. In addition. OWNER shall be WA for any actual byRESIDENTS-Irproprmainennce. Both OWNER and RESi-
damages Incurred by RESIDENT as a result o delayed occu- DENT shall sign and receive an executed copy of the inventory
pancy. The term of this lease shall not be extended by any delay statement.
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(d) Within three (3) weeks after RESIDENTecatse. OWNER 14. REMEDIES AND DAMAGES ON BREACH OF LEASE. (a)
wil deliver to RESIDENT a check in E atmt of the scuity In the event RESIDENT defaults in the performance of any term.
deposit (pius any Interest due therein) minus any deductions for covenant, or condtlon of ti lease. OWNER may, in addition to
damages in excess of reasonable use and wear, and further, any other rghtsr or remedies OWNER may have. elect to dectlre
minus any other deductions for failure on the parl of RESIDENT the lease forfeited and proceed to recover possession of the
to perform under the lease. as provided for under Cakfornia ChM premises in summaryproceedings for unLawfuf detoiner or in an
Code 1950.5.intheeventanydedctionismade. OWNERshall ejectment or other possessory action. It OWNER pursues an
furnish RESIDENT with an itenized statement accouthig for unlawful detainer action. OWNER must seve RESIDENTwith a
the use of the unreunded portion of the security deposit. iectud. three-day notice pursuant to Caornia Code of Ciil Procedure
ing a detailed itemization ot labor end materials. Thrbad faIth 1161. OWNER may not remove anyone forcbldy from a dwelling:
retention of the security deposit may subject OWNEJF to liabtiiy, only a peace Officer. acting upon cout instruction may do so.
per California CMii Code 1950.5, for up to $600 in damages in (b) f RESIDENT breaches the lease by abandoning the
addition to any actual damages. precies before the end of the term. or if RESIDENT'S right to
7. REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE. OWNER shall place the psession Is terminated by OWNER because of RESIDENTS
premises in good repair and condition fit for human habitlaon. breach of the lease. OWNER may declare the lease terminated
as defined under CaOornia C"I Code 1941. before RESIDENT nd may reoverfom RESIDENT such amounts as provided for
begins to occupy the premises, and shall keep the premises and under Catforna CMI Code 1m51.?
the bildilng in good repairduringtheterm of Otis ese. OWNER OWNER must atempt to mitigate damages by making a
shal do the same in regard to the common areas of the building, reasonabi effort to retet the pre=ss and reduce actual dam-
If OWNER fails to maintain the premises in a habitable condition, ages. OWNER shelt be condusively presum ed to have made a
RESIDENTS may exercise their rights to repair and deduct reasonable attempt to lecate a mpacement resident Ift OWNER
pursuant to Cailonia Ci Code 1942. places an advertisement for this purpose in a local newspaper
RESIDENTS agree to exercse reasonale car in the ase for thre (3) cosocutve days w every two-week periodOf the premises an to keep aeas under their controa free from theralet and ist s, the vcancy with th Universit of Cakfomin.
din. trsh. and frth. RESIDENTS also agree not to tiller or Davis Cormunity Housing Lisilg Service.
damage the common areas ot the building. The cost of repars (C) In the event of a breach by OWNER of any mateial term
caused by RESIDENTS. their guests, or parsons under their ofthis$eafse. RESIDENTshallhave suchlega remedies asmay
control shall be paid for by RESIDENTS; otherwise. me cost Of be avalt . Induding those provided for under the Csomteia
repairs shall be paid by OWNER. AR repairs shall be made witn C Code.
a reasonable time. 15. LEASE RENEWAL OWNER is not required to renew this
S. HABITABILITY. (a) If through any natural or extraosTiary lease at the end of the term. After furnishing RESIDENT with the
force or because of the negligence of a thri parson. the pre terms of the new lease, OWNER may request RESIDENT to
mises are rendered unnhabeable. this lease may be ltermlnated sign an Option to Lease at any time. OWNER may not. however.
at the election of either party. If the lease is so termin'ted, then require RESIDENT to sign a renewal tease prior to one hundred
all prepaid rents and refundable security deposits shall be re- (100) days befom commencement of the tease.
funded to RESIDENT. t RESIDENT has reason to believe that the renewal rate is
(b) Subparagraph (a) above shall be Inoperable it OWNER unjustified. then upon RESIDENTS request. OWNER or
either restores the premises too habitable condiion or provides OWNER'S AGENT agrees 1o confer with RESIDENT regarding
in substitution thereof comparable housing to RESIDENT within the renewal rate. Such conference must be requested within ten
fifteen (15) days after the date the premises were rendered (10) woding days of renewat rate notiicaion. and OWNER
uninhabitable. It subsitute housing is not provided and OWNER agrees to comply within rw (5) woreng days of receiving the
elects to restore the premises, the RESIDENT shall be enitled request In the event that a lease is not signed as a result ofthi
to a pro-rated reduction of resnt for the period during which the conference. RESIDENT may istlite rediaion according to the
premises were untrilmtitbl. Rent Mediation Povisin of thstease (Pargraph 16). Media ion
9. SRVIE O NOIC .(a)An rftv noice ofdemnds must be requ.ested by RESIDENT within 
f"N (5) workin days of
0. SERViCE OF NOTICE. (a) AS writt notices or deaidad the conlerace with OWNER. All pontis agree to eapedle roe-
hereunder shall beserved either personally or by maL ditonf a 
id OWNER agrees not to ofer the xpe di to any
(b) Any notice or demand to OWNER may be given at the oter piospedive 
resident for at feast ten (10) days tovte
address farst shown above. 
sudh request fotroedlenfora
(c) Any notice or demand to RESIDENTS 
may be given to
them at the leased premises. Service by OWNER on the RESI- 1. MEDIATION. In the everf that OWNER and RESIDENTare
DENT as heretofre mentioned in Section G (5),hal be deemed unable to resolve any dispute orctuab arising out of ft rental
to be service on all RESIDENTS hereto. If such RESIDENT agreement. either party may submit the dipute to any or al
cannot be IoctedIMrough the reasonable efforts of the OWNER, eastablshed methods of meditn, Such as those oEffered by the
service On any one or more of the RESIDENTS hereto el" be Davis Community Mediation Service. This provision shal not be
adequate. construed or interpreted to constitute an arbtration dause ro-
10. ENTRY. Pursuant to Califorrda Code 1954. OWNER quttlg aritation. nor as the sle or exclusive 
remedy to both
may enter the dwelEng unit only in the following cases: 
17.
(0i In cse of omeogeny; 17. RULES AND REGULATIONS. E luts WW regula-
(w) to make necessary or agreed repaira. decorations, alter. tEonts of OWNER with respectto the premises strl be signed by
atioas. or improvements; Supply necessary or agreed services; al RESIDENTS. attached herein. and incorgorated by reference
or exihit the dweting unit to prospective or actual purchasers, as If fully set forth. Other roles and regulatlons may be adopted
mortgagees. resdents.worker orcontractors: by OWNER after the signing of this lease but shall have a
(V-) when RESIDENT has abandoned or surrendered the legitirate purpose, not be arbitrary nor unequally enforced, nor
premises t work a ebstantiat mndiiclation of RESIDENTs tights. Such new
(iv) pursuant to court order or roles and regulations wi not take effect t at least two (2)
(v) with RESIDENTS consent weeks after notice to alt RESIDENTS. I any event. such other
Except in cases of emergency or when RESIDENT has rnles or regulations shal not conflict with the terms and cond.
abandoned or surrendered the premises, or unless RESIDENT tions of this leaso.
consents at the time of entry, entry may not be made other than 18. HOLDING OVER. RESIDENT is not to remain in the pro.
between the hours of eight in the morning and eight in the mises beyond the date agreed upon as the expiration of this
evenag. and only after giving 24 bum written notice of the lease except with the written consent of OWNER RESIDENTS
intent to enter to RESIDENT. Any RESIDENT receiving said whoevacethepremirseson thetermlinatondateset forthin this
notice or gising consent shat inform other RESIDENTS, If any lease shall not be responsible for RESIDENTS who do not so
of proposed entry. OWNER shall not abuse the tight of access or vacate.
use ittoharassRESIDENT. 19. MANAGEMENT. RESIDENT shal receive written notice
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11. AUTOMATIC TERMINATION. 'his lease shal tarlhate
with regard to any RESIDENT who:
(0 dies:
(i) becomes so II that sihe withdraws from school;
(ii) is Involuntarily Inducted Into the mIitary servicb.
Under (a) and (Teu) above. RESIDENT must provide OWNER
with written notice and upon request may be required to furnish
reasonable verification of the tacts justifying termination.
Termination under this paragraph shal not in anyway affect
the Iiabilttyof the remaining RESIDENTS under the lease except
that their joint and several liability shall no longer apply to the
former RESIDENT'S share of the rental obligation 4uring the
thirty (30) day period following written notice. Any termination
under this paragraph shall not affect the right of t" remaining
RESIDENTS to the refund of their portion of the security deposit
at the end of this lease. However, there shall be no return or
reduction In the amount of the security deposit as long as the
lease is not terminated as to all of the RESIDENTS, hereunder.
Within fifteen (15) days of such automatic termination,
OWNER by mutual agreement with remaining RESIDENTS,
may-
(i request remaining RESIDENTS to assume full rent or
quit and terminate this lease; or
(it) provide comparable but proportionately smaller housing
In substitution for the leasehold premises, which property is to be
leased by RESIDENTS on the same terms and conditions ex-
cept that the rental is to be reduced as provided in subparagraph
(ii) immediately below; or
(i) permit remaining RESIDENTS to retain possession of
the leasehold premises for the rental stated herein, reduced
proportionately by an amount equal to the former RESIDENT'S
share of the rental otherwise remaining to be paid unit a suitable
replacement can be found. In such event RESIDENTS with the
help of the OWNER shalt make a reasonable eftort to find a
suitable replacement. OWNER and RESIDENTS shall be pre-
sumed to have made a reasonable attempt to locate a new
RESIDENT it they place an advertisement for this purpose In a
local newspapor for three (3) consecutive days within everytwo-
week pe riod thereafter and also list the vacancy with the Univer-
sity ol California, Davis Community Housing Listing Service.
If at the end of fifteen (15) days mutual agreement has not
been reached. OWNER shalt have the option to choose one of
the above alternatives. In which case the remaining RESIDENTS
wilt have fifteen (15) day to comply. .
12. JOB TRANSFER TERMINATION. If RESIDENT is trsns-
tarred beyond a forty (40) mile radius of Davis by an employerfor
whom RESIDENT is employed ful-time at the commencement
of the lease. arid said employer wilt not accept Liablity for
RESIDENTS share'of this Lease, this lease shat terminate.
Tenninalion dial ocur only alter RESIDENT has given OWNER
ninety (90) days written notice for dwelng complexes of four (4)
or fewer units or thirty (30) days written notice for dwelng
complexes of five (5) or more units. LIability of remaining RESI-
DENTS shall be determined using Paragraph 11 (i, (ii), or (E). It
at the end of the notice period, mutual agreement has not been
rached, OWNER shall have the option to elect one of the above
altematives. in which case remaining RESIDENTS have fifteen
(15) days to comply.
13. SUBLEASE OR ASSIGNMENT. (a) RESIDENT shalt not
sublease orassign this lease. oranynterest therein, without first
obtaining the written consent of the OWNER.
(b) In the event OWNER releases any of the RESIDENTS
hereunder without secunng a replacement RESIDENT, the re-
maining RESIDENTS shall no longer be jointly and severally
liable for the departing RESIDENT'S share of the rent remaining
to be paid.
(c) Notwitstanding any other provision contained in this
paragraph. OWNER agrees to give consent to a sublease or
assignment, it the prospectve RESIDENT is determined by the
OWNER to be a person generally desirable as a RESIDENT.
OWNER may not unreasonably withhold coer)ent to such a
sublease or assignmenL The remaining RESIDENTS will exer-
cise good faith and reasonableness in accepting a new RESI-
DENT.
Wilhin rlten (15) days of any dalige in managers. agantrlr
receipt of renL. and/or OWNERS (of agents authorized to act for
OWNER). Such notice will Include names, addresses, and phone
numbers of such persons.
20. NOISE AND NUISANCE. RESIDENT agrees not to make
any excessive nose or nuisance such as wil disturb the peace
and quiet of neighbors. OWNER agrees to maintain peace and
quiet In those areas of the building which are subject to OWNER
control.
21. VISITATION AND GUESTS. RESIDENT may have occa.
sional overnight guests without notice to or consent of OWNER.
The number of guests shall not exceed two (2) at any time
regardless of the number of RESIDENTS. The same overnight
guest may not stay more than three (3) nights during any con.
secutive fifteen (15) day period, except with the written permis-
sion of OWNER.
22. UABILITY FOR INJURY. RESIDENT is not liable in anyway
for the death or injury to any person or property caused by or
through the fault of the OWNER. OWNER is not liable in any way
for the death or injury to any person or property caused by or
through the fault of RESIDENT.
23. PETS. Pets are not allowed in the premises or other por-
tions of the building except upon the written consent of OWNER.
24. OWNER'S CONVEYANCE. If during the term of this tease
OWNER shall sell hither interest as OWNER in the building or
premises, then from and alter the eftective date of the sale, the
former OWNER shall be released and discharged from any and
all obligations and responsitbiities under this Lease, provided that
the now OWNER agrees to fulfill the terms, covenants, and
conditions of this lease.
25. COMMON FACILITIES. RESIDENTmay use al recreaona.
Laundry. and study faciities on the premises subject to posted
regulations.
26. USE. The premises are to be used exclusively for lawful
residential purposes.
27. LEGAL FEES. In the event of any legal action concerning
this lease, the losing party shal pay to the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees and court costs to be Lind by the
court wherein such judgment shall be entered.
28. ALTERATIONS. RESIDENT shall not make, or cause to be
made. any alterations of the said premises or their contents
withdut first obtaining the written consent of OWNER.
29. PARKING. Aft vehicles are to be parked solely In those
areas designated by OWNER. No charge shall be made for
parking unless otherwise staled in this lease.
30. WAIVER.Anywaier, byeitherpartyherato of any breach of
any provision of this lease, shall not be deemed lo be a continu-
ing waiver or a waiver of subsequent breach of the same or a
difterent provision of this lease.
31. CONDEMNATION. If any pad of the premises shall be
taken or condemned for a public or quasi-pubic use. this lease
shall thereupon tenlnat. All compensation awarded upon such
condemnation or taking shall go to OWNER and RESIDENT
shat have no claim thereto. RESIDENT hereby Irrevocably as-
signs and transfers to OWNER any right to compensation or
damages to which RESIDENT may become entitled during the
term hereof by reason of the condernation of all, or a pait of the
demised premises. RESIDENT shall, however, have the right to
a refund from OWNER of any unused portion of the security
deposit as well as a full refund of any advanced rents.
32. COVENANTS AND CONDITIONS. Each term and each
provision of this lease by either party shall be construed to be
beth a covenant and a condidin.
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